Developments in Administration: The e-Journal of the IIAS, the IASIA and the Regional Groups of the IIAS (ISSN 2466-8877) is an open access electronic journal published by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), Rue Defacqz 1/11, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium.

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An Editorial Note by Michiel S. De Vries
This is the first issue of the e-journal of the IIAS, IASIA and regional groups. This journal aims at expanding knowledge about developments in the public administration and public sector in countries and regions not extensively covered in the major journals in public administration. We would like to have papers that describe, try to explain or evaluate recent developments in governance, public administration or public policies in one or a couple of such countries. Be it about reforms, new managerial processes, policy developments, new developments in human resource management and so on. The only restriction is that the paper be relevant for the practice of public administration research and training, for the discipline of public administration and/or for the practice of public administration.

One aim of the journal is to provide a publication platform for high-quality papers presented at a conference of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) and International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) regional groups. At the IASIA conference in Paris in June 2015, the main theme was on alternative service delivery arrangements. Therefore most of the articles in this first issue address this issue.

This first issue consists of five articles. The first one is the keynote speech given by Wolfgang Drechsler, who addresses the classic notion on good governance, the role of the state and its role in service delivery. The second article is a policy paper by John Mary Kauzya of UNDESA, in which he explicates what is necessary to make the new sustainable development goals come true. The third article is an analysis from within by Bianor Cavalcanti, from the Fundacion Getulio Vargas, on what is currently happening in a country seemingly in distress, namely Brazil. Cavalcanti argues that despite the current crisis in Brazil, many steps have been taken in Brazil to strengthen its institutional capacity regarding the way of doing business and dealing with public-private partnerships as concerns fiscal and budgetary responsibility, as well as making politics in the country more transparent, accountable and focused on the common good.

The fourth article is a short discussion paper by Nada Abdelkader Benmansour, in which she puts forth a paradox visible in Qatar, namely that its own citizens are most satisfied about life while being less satisfied about
public services, and the migrant population is more satisfied about public services in Qatar while being less satisfied about life. The fifth paper, a research article by PhD student Mary Mangai, presents the outcomes of her research on public service delivery in Ghana and Nigeria. She finds a strong relationship between household satisfaction and problems experienced in public service delivery. The outcomes also show that satisfaction with public service delivery involves more than government performance as such. Political, geographical and demographic factors are also important predictors of such satisfaction.

This first issue therefore illustrates the papers this new journal is looking for, namely keynote speeches delivered at one of the conferences of IASIA or IIAS regional groups, policy papers, analyses from within, discussion papers and PhD research papers. We also encourage papers written from the perspective of trainees and students and/or written in such a way as to be supportive for enabling discussion among students and trainees about the merits of the developments and trends as described in the paper.

Papers that are less relevant for this journal are papers giving just a description of what one can read also on government websites, extensive theoretical papers – there are plenty of other journals publishing such papers – or politically oriented papers, because this is a journal about developments in administration.

On behalf of the editorial board,

Michiel S. de Vries
Il Buon Governo Senese: Classic Aspects of (Alternative) Public Service Delivery
An IASIA Keynote Speech by Wolfgang Drechsler
INTRODUCTION

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, it’s a great honour, pleasure and privilege to be in this auditorium, in this distinguished place, to deliver the first academic keynote to this year’s IASIA conference. And I am actually amazed how many of you have shown up here again after the short break, because the temptation to go out to Paris and sit in a café, rather than here inside, is surely great. Paris is actually a perfect example of how much a city can be a built illustration of the topics we are dealing with at this conference. If you go out of the Lycée Louis-le-Grand and down the Rue Cujas to the Boul’mich’, turn right and head down towards the Seine, you will see the Musée de Cluny, which includes the old Roman baths, the thermae of Paris. It’s a sight you can’t miss.

What does that have to do with PA? What does that have to do with alternative service delivery? Well, the Western style of public administration and management goes directly, in practice, back to Ancient Rome, where one of the key tasks of the state, already 2000 years ago, was the provision of public health. Public health is not an extra of the twentieth-century welfare state. And the idea of the public thermae is that of preventive medicine – if you go and wash yourself, you and others simply live longer than if you don’t. The provision of public baths as a core function of the state is, in a way, the inversion of what we are talking about today; in other words, the alternative delivery is alternatively done by the state and not by the private sector. This is one example of how we can understand what we are doing from the historical buildings of Paris, and something like this is what I will be doing further on.

That said, PA has to go with the time, adapt and adopt, because PA always happens in context and in the society we live in. In fact, very few social-scie science disciplines are as fashion driven as ours. We do so many things because we want to look cool at international conferences. We don’t think of why we do certain things, but we do them because everybody does them. ‘Me-too-ism’ is one of the main drivers of PMR. That’s not a flippant point, but a very important one, because it calls upon us to step back and evaluate why we are really doing things – in spite of the very creative and
important role that fashion actually plays. Fashion often drives us into the right direction, even if we otherwise wouldn’t want to go there. For instance, a lot of people don’t want any form of e-governance. This is stressful: you have to learn new things. You just learnt how to use email, and now you have to unlearn this again, because email is for old-fashioned people. But on the other hand, this is how the world is turning. Life does happen more and more on your smartphone, and if you don’t pick up the citizens where they are, you’ll not be able to deal with them. The main paradigm for PM in the future will probably be the smart city.

As far as service delivery is concerned, I always used to say that the thing about public services is that I have to get them where I am; it’s not flexible. That is the specifics of the state: I am in one political unit at a time. The country in which I work, Estonia, as you might have noticed, however, has established something called e-residency. You can get an Estonian ID card in spite of not being an Estonian or even in Estonia, and therefore avail yourself of the very convenient Estonian e-services. Thus, we now seem to move into a time when it’s not only theoretically but also practically so, that we can shop around for various services from various governments if they provide them better than ours. (That also means, by the way, that we finally get to real public-sector innovation and not just to public-sector innovation as a cliché, because usually we call public-sector innovation anything cool we like in PA. But innovation is always about competition, and in this new, e-based way, one can get to state competition for the citizens.)

And it is not always those governments that we like for their ethics that perform the best, which is an issue at the core of one of the biggest recent debates in our field, the 2013 discussion launched by Francis Fukuyama about the connection of democracy and good governance, whether they are the same or not, whether you can have the latter without the former. Regarding PA in this context, Geert Bouckaert has made the very profound distinction between equity and performance. The classic global-Western model of PA implies that high equity and high performance are always joint. What Fukuyama has reminded us of is that that’s not the case anymore, assuming that it ever was. We need to face the fact that in some countries where equity is lower than we would like, performance is better than in
others, even in ours. And it doesn’t work to say, ‘Yeah, but it shouldn’t be so’ and stamp on the ground like a four-year-old.

This leads us to the question of PA paradigms. Classic Chinese PA comes from a totally different background and might define equity in a different way than does the global West; regarding our immediate topic, it does not have much alternative service delivery. But the third of the four big paradigms of PA of our time, the Islamic one, has many institutions which have consciously, for many centuries, provided classic public services in an NGO way, the waqf system being the most important one, which in many countries, including Turkey, is now coming back, if in a somewhat different form.

SIENA, TUSCANY

However, although, or maybe because, IASIA is this beautifully global conference, I will talk today about core Western PA, and that is somewhat legitimate because global PA is largely Western PA, although for me, it’s almost exotic to talk about the West at IASIA. But at least, we will turn to one of the most interesting and beautiful areas of the West, and that is Tuscany, where every PA person in Northern Europe wants to have a summer house – a place that for many has the best food, the best wine, the most beautiful sunsets. And so I hope that even though we are in Paris, you will come with me there, because when we talk about the origins of alternative service delivery, I think that there is a place with which I can illustrate very well that this is not an innovative, but a classic, concept.

This concept is manifest in the historic Tuscan cities, and the main example of those may today be Siena, because Siena, in the middle of Tuscany, doesn’t have an airport; it doesn’t have a real highway connection; it has preserved everything really well. Still, the most gothic of the Tuscan cities, Siena is not just a tourist destination with a city attached, and therefore it is a place that is particularly worth looking into. Siena is also, or it was until very recently, a very successful city by today’s standards. There is no murder rate to speak of; there is a comprehensive kindergarten
structure; there is Wi-Fi to use for free – everything is as it should be. There is very high social capital without a lot of discrimination, and the same kids that really love their hip-hop music or their house still spend part of their free time training for historical performances, such as flag-throwing. You have the feeling of a happy, positive, well-working community.

Now, if you look more closely at positive stories, they are never non-black and all white. We are not in a field that is characterized by black and white. Our field, dealing with government, is always nuanced, is always grey, as even the best governments in the world have their dark sides. That is the nature of government. But still, Siena is a nice place – you even have a lot of promising future technology, the bio-valley of Tuscany, with biochemical research. But we will start with the earlier Siena, the Siena of High Gothic times.

**THE FRESCOES**

Siena is dominated by the cathedral on the hill, but a little bit lower, there is the city hall. The city hall has a huge tower, however, and it’s so huge that, from most perspectives, the tower is higher than the cathedral tower, which is the point – it says that the city hall is what matters, not the cathedral. And in that focal city hall, there is, at its core, the Chamber of the Nine, named after the nine city councilmen who would meet there. Painted in the 1330s by the great artist Ambrogio Lorenzetti at the time when Siena was one of the leading Western cities in the arts, this is a depiction of good and bad government and their effect on the countryside and the city. It is the first large secular piece of art since the fall of Ancient Rome, and it sums up in an artistically brilliant way, in one that speaks very directly to us, the essence of what good and bad government means.

As we approach Lorenzetti, we recognize these images from the covers and pages of PA textbooks, because we don’t have many visualizations of good government. But here we do. And this is something that many of us assume intuitively to be right, like, for instance, the writings of Aristotle or Thomas More. We approach these frescoes tacitly assuming that they
indeed sum up an idea of good life in the good city, the good state, and so they do.

On the first wall, there is the allegory of good government; on the second, its effects; and on the third wall, combined, bad government’s allegory and its effects. The fourth wall is windows. Let’s look at this cycle a bit closer.

**Image 1 – Lorenzetti, Allegory of Good Government, Siena Town Hall (public domain)**

This is the allegory of good government. Good (Sienese) government itself is the white-bearded person sitting on a throne centre-right, but the narrative starts on the left. On top left, on the highest level, is wisdom, *Sapienza*. So this is a great fresco for PA scholars because it’s not justice; it’s not goodness; it’s not the popular will; it’s not religion; but it’s the scientific insight into things that is superior to everything else. It dominates even over Justice, which is both punishing and distributive, directly below. A rope emanates from Wisdom, is passed through Justice’s two scales, goes down and is twilled together by *Concordia*, unity of the citizenry, without which nothing works in the community, and then is passed on by real Sienese citizens to the incarnation of good government, tying his arm which holds the sceptre of rule. He is surrounded by six virtues symbolizing
what you need in order to have good government, and a little bit up, around his head, there are Christian Faith, Love and Hope, but noticeably, that’s the only religious element of the entire fresco.

There are also a lot of military figures in the scene and a lot of prisoners. We expect good government to be peaceful, but the idea of defence against your enemies so that you can live the life you want is crucial, at that time and generally. One of the six virtues, however, is Peace; she is on the left fringe of the group, but in the middle of the fresco. This is probably the first full-scale, body-revealing (with a translucent white dress), reclining female in post-antiquity Western art. She is and has been for some time the most popular figure of the frescoes; the entire room was even named after her for a time. (You can always tell, if you want to know what kind of artwork in a museum or historic place is really popular, by going to the souvenir shop. What you get on all the mugs and mousepads is what people really like. Half the mugs on sale here show Lady Peace.)

Yet the closest counsellor of good government, sitting in the place of honour, is Prudence, Prudentia. And that, in today’s terms, would be appropriateness, which means there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. (Almost) everything depends on context, demographics, resources, capacity and technology. That appropriateness is indeed the main PA virtue, as we will see illustrated very soon, is of central importance for understanding good government.

Then follows the fresco of the happy city, the happy life (happy in the sense of eudaimonia, not of ‘fun’), the peaceful life. There are people dancing in the streets, safe travel, a bride riding to her wedding, and houses look very beautiful. As urban-studies people will tell you, the architecture looks individual, but there is a lot of planning behind that. If you let people build randomly, it doesn’t look like that. You do need someone who keeps it in line. In the centre, you see that the shops are full, and students are listening to their professor, from which you can gather that it’s indeed a historical painting (if it was contemporary, students would be updating their Facebook status, right?). The dancing in the street is not a disturbance, but it belongs to the city. It will be regulated, but this kind of happy celebration of membership in the group is part of it all. At top centre, you have a very
famous building scene from which you can see how these Sienese Gothic buildings were constructed, namely with scaffolding from the outside. A good city is not a quiet bucolic city, not a village where everybody takes a nap, but you do need construction. You do need to move forward; you do need space. And that comes out very well here – a city of hustle and bustle, and yet beautiful and satisfying.

Next to it, we have a smaller segment on the effects of good government on the countryside [not depicted here]. With safe travel, with high-quality infrastructure and with what is doubtlessly the farming of high-quality, ecologically responsible, tasty food. The lady floating above all of this, Securitas, is a bit weird for us today, as in her hand she holds as her symbol a hangman. But obviously, this means that those who want to disturb the
countryside’s peace must be, and are, sustainably prevented from doing so by the good guys.

**Image 3 – Lorenzetti, Allegory of Bad Government and Its Effect on City and Country, Siena Town Hall (public domain).**

Bad government is all together in one fresco, allegory, effect on the city, effect on the countryside. Everything is broken down: broken windows – only broken windows; ruined houses; poverty – nothing is happening. Even the fresco itself is heavily damaged. And that is something one needs to remember in the ‘First World’: the alternative to good government is always at your doorstep. It is not an achievement we can take for granted. *Timor*, fear, is dominating the countryside (up on left), and in the city you have a famous scene (in the low centre) of a dead citizen, a rape victim and fancily dressed soldiers. Only mercenaries are rich in the bad city.

Or almost only. There is a space here, just between the ruined houses of the bad city and the allegory of bad government, where the houses are actually still fine. Somebody is living quite well between the slums and bad government, but who is that? They have stepped outside, but we don’t see their faces anymore, as they have fallen off. This is very enigmatic, but there are two people, just standing above the corpse, who are not dressed fancily, but well, like the bourgeois aristocrats in the first painting, and who are looking at all this mayhem. And that may be a reminder that even bad government doesn’t go without profit for a few at least. And that is why some people are actually in favour of bad government, and they will defend it and its ideology.
Next to this, on the right, is the allegory of bad government, supported by six vices, and around its head, the three main sins. But what are the worst sins for government? We might think violence, corruption or something like that, but no. For Lorenzetti, they are *Avaricia*, which is greed or misery; *Vaingloria*, vanity; and *Superbia*, pride. So, arrogance, inflated pride, cock-sureness, trying to save money at all cost all the time – these are the worst things. Saving money is not the point of the city, of the country. The country is no little boy saving for a bike or, today, for an iPhone, because that’s not the point of human living-together. If you think about it, this description of the vices of bad government catches exactly the essence of NPM and of what’s wrong with it. Maybe this is, these days, the ideology easily endorsable by the profiteers from the urban-effects scene?

Aristotle says that the state comes into existence for the sake of life, and it stays in existence for the good life. That, I think, is what the Lorenzetti frescoes, when we talk about service delivery, remind us of in a much-nuanced way. The good life is of incredible importance; it needs to be there – the happy life is important. But before the happy life comes life as such. That means the city is the bulwark against anarchy, against real problems, against violence and death. Freedom through the city rather than against the city – that is the point that is brilliantly displayed here – and then, also, happiness. The main point, the beginning point for the state, is life as such, a free life, a communal life, and only then comes service delivery.

THE QUARTER AND THE RACE

Speaking of communal life, even today Siena is very interesting in, as I said, its cohesion, in its working-together, in its traditionalism, its citizens’ identification with the city. However, if, in Siena, you ask somebody whether she is from Siena, she will say, ‘I’m from the *Onda*’, which means ‘the Wave’. What does that mean? It means a person from Siena would primarily identify with her quarter. The city of Siena is divided into small neighbourhoods that are the primary functioning units to provide not only many services and benefits but also identity. The city, except the *Piazza del*...
Municipio in the middle, where the city hall stands, is divided into neighbourhoods, quartiers, arrondissements – whatever you want to call them. If you ask a Sienese in Bangkok where he is from, he will of course say, ‘From Siena’, or maybe even ‘From Italy’, but otherwise, home is the quarters. They are called ‘contrade’, and these areas have their colours, their celebrations, their animals, their community, their people.

Where the contrade really come to life – and when they take the front seat of urban identity, but also of the public imagination all over Italy and even by now globally – is the famous Sienese horse race, twice a year, a race which is sponsored by the contrade, on the piazza del campo, called the palio. Every neighbourhood gets one horse and also one jockey, but the jockey is just commissioned; it’s the horses that race against each other. You identify with your neighbourhood, and therefore you want to win. You don’t want your enemy quarters to win, and if you don’t win, at least your friend-contrada should win, and through this you have a generation of identity and focus on these contrade that is really profound. The palio is and remains the central and constitutive event for Siena and Sienese identity, and it is a contrade event. It has become an immensely popular, nationally broadcast, very fancy event during the course of the twentieth century, but it remains locally Sienese.

Why am I talking about this horse race when our topic is alternative service delivery, new modes and classical ones? Well, some might think that splitting the city in small areas, in small villages, in units, ruins identification with the city, but no, it doesn’t. And that is something that, for instance, regarding municipal autonomy, ministries of the interior generally don’t (want to) realize. If you have a strong local identity, it does not erase the identity you have with the higher division, but it might easily actually strengthen it as well. This is the entire idea of federalism. Federalism is not against the centre; this was Karl von Stein’s point, and the idea of municipal autonomy is that it strengthens rather than weakens the central government.

Now, when you win the palio, you win a painted flag of that name – that is, nothing. The entire race is about nothing. You can have that massive competition among the contrade because it’s about nothing. It’s not about
money in the city. It’s not about allocation of services. It’s not about power. It is like carnival. It’s like – think about competitions where people almost get heart attacks because of whether their team wins or not, but which literally mean nothing whatsoever. Nothing makes less sense in the universe than soccer, and still it’s exciting, and still this is where people go berserk. You might know that in some European countries there is now a fad that you have the symbol of your soccer team on your tombstone because you identify so much with it. It has become quasi-religious. And yet it’s about nothing. But that’s important. You can have a strong competition and something that creates identity, but because it is about nothing, it doesn’t lead to political or financial conflicts that otherwise would surely follow.

And that is exactly the case in Siena, because – and this is what scholarly works on Siena sometimes don’t recognize – while they have street signs, and while the city, or at least downtown, is very visibly divided into the contrade, they are actually not part of the city administration. City hall has nothing – I repeat, nothing – to do with the contrade. The contrade are NGOs, complete NGOs. They produce social capital. They do deliver services on a very important level, but they are not government. This is an amazing accomplishment, because a lot of the fun, of meeting people, of caring for the elderly, of integration – this entire idea of a small social community where people help each other in the sense of an extended family seems accomplished here. There are various problems – what do you do with people who have recently moved to Siena? What do you do with people who live outside the old city? But still, in principle you have alternative service delivery from NGOs, apart from city hall, and it seems to work extremely well.

Of course, it may be doubtful whether this could be accomplished, let alone right away, anywhere else (not every city has medieval horse races!), but first of all, it must be noted that this can be done at all. Yet, is it really only the history, the horse race, the context that make this possible in Siena? As PA people, we will be perhaps more suspicious than others, and we will surely ask very quickly, if we have such important and powerful NGOs, who is paying for all of this, if not the government?
THE BANK

Indeed, all these historical costumes, all these horses and all the men, the free Wi-Fi, all the free this, that and something else in Siena – where does it come from? Someone must pay for this, we know, and the easy answer is that there indeed is such a one. Siena is the home of one of the ten biggest banks in Italy, the Monte dei Paschi de Siena, which is also the oldest bank in existence. (Some people I know from the public-finance crowd got checking accounts there just because they wanted to bank with the Monte, because that’s such a cool thing.) The Monte dei Paschi was established in order to get away from money lending as a problematic business in the Middle Ages, endorsed by the city, and it is therefore very similar to the savings-banks systems like the German Sparkassen. That means cooperative savings, funding SMEs and, for instance, real-estate ownership of the middle classes, something that goes against certain economic orthodoxies, but which has the beauty of really working and making the communities better. And it was the Monte dei Paschi that footed most of the ‘extra’ bills of Siena, which it could do because it was essentially a not-for-profit bank, one whose point was not to enrich the shareholders, but the clients, both as regards savings and loans and soon through providing sponsorship of urban life as well. Many functionaries of bank and foundation would be city fathers and vice versa, but the connection was mostly personal, not institutional.

Now because of various changes, mostly in EU law, a bank like that was seen as anti-competitive for private, profit-oriented banks, and so a Foundation Monte dei Paschi was created, and the bank became part of what the Foundation owned. The Foundation was essentially city-held. It received all the profits and spent much of those, probably about 50% of its net income, on deserving causes in the city, for charity, cultural sponsoring and the like: the soccer club, the free vaccinations, the cool kindergartens that everybody had access to. And this is where the money came from for the palio and much contrade culture. If you think about it, you have a mid-sized city which gets 50% of the profits of one of the top ten banks in a main industrial country; of course you can have a great urban life! A lot of things go much easier if you have a few million extra, let alone a few billion.
So alternative Sienese service delivery was based on an alternative financial model, steering much of the profits of essentially an SOE into the urban community, largely outside of, but in conjunction with, city hall. Result-wise, it apparently worked extremely well.

Now Monte dei Paschi is very traditional, but it also was very modern. And as a modern bank, it had to get through the past ten years. And that proved to be a problem. As so often the Monte wanted to enlarge, because you have to be competitive and so on –you know all the enlargement rhetoric, which in the end is mostly about budget maximization by the directors. And so Monte dei Paschi bought all kinds of other institutions and made all kinds of speculative deals just before the financial crisis. On the evening of the big collapse, in 2007, they acquired the Antonveneta Bank, another regional bank, for €2 billion more than competitor Paribas was willing to pay. Of course this couldn’t go well.

The edifice collapsed during the crisis, and it collapsed in the very worst way. The value of their stock radically dropped over time, and there was news about bad management and fraud as well. Once, during the bank’s protracted collapse, there had been the admission that they somehow forgot to budget some €730 million somewhere. Something went wrong with their accounts, they said, but €730 million is not an ‘oops’ anymore. The police got in, and since the bank and the city were closely intertwined, this led to the breakdown of the city government, and big accountability and legitimacy questions in the latter as well. And so Siena was hoping that at least the biotech industry would still work, but then the main biotech start-up in Siena, Siena Biotech, went bankrupt also, just a few weeks ago. When it rains, it pours.

Because of the bank’s collapse, the Foundation had to sell shares it had in the bank, and that means that today, the Foundation doesn’t own that much of the bank anymore. So, what you have today is a city in which much that is beautiful and nice and healthy and friendly and modern was regularly financed by a Foundation which almost went bust and which has hardly any income anymore. So Monte dei Paschi essentially went out of the business of being nice for the city; it is not the city’s bank anymore.
For Siena, this would mean that after the reserves are spent, no more soccer luxuries, no more kindergartens, no more free vaccinations and no more palio, at least not on the recent level. The palio is in danger as we speak – and the fear is that the contrade might be as well. As for now, there is still some money left, but these medieval costumes don’t come for free. Still, palio and contrade existed before massive bank sponsorship, and they can not only survive by scaling down but also serve as a scaffolding of urban life while the city is not doing so well anymore.

Yet this is, if you have alternative financing rather than by the city itself, what you can also get and what we saw a lot with cheesy financing models of city-owned enterprises after the Global Crisis, rather than going with the old, boring, primitive, tired, dull, senior civil-service, state-administered models. As soon as problems knock on your door, these might not be the worst. Government is not about being cool; it’s about being good. We might leave cool to somebody else; coolness has its negative sides.

On the other hand, we do live in times and in a system that are fashion-driven. And fashion also pushes new ways and modes, as I illustrated in the beginning with e-governance. It wouldn’t have been possible for the president of Monte dei Paschi in the early 2000s to say, ‘I’m not interested in budget expansion. I just do what my job is, to finance SMEs, to be a natural regional lender’, and so on. Still, realizing that it is a fashion – and judging what makes sense by taking this previously invoked one step back that Aristotle reminds us of taking – might not really be the worst advice. People who tell the public sector to ‘save or maximize all your money all the time’, yet cannot answer the question why, as Lorenzetti tells us and as the Monte dei Paschi story reminds us, definitely give bad advice.

CODA

To sum up, public-service delivery is of key importance. Our modern life without it is not imaginable. On the other hand, it is not the most important thing about the state. The state is not primarily about service delivery. The most important task of the state is life – not the good life, which comes as a
second step. NGOs can do a lot in the right context and if backed up by the state. If this interplay works, private service delivery is possible, but if we look at the last five years, its track record is surely problematic. It can work very well indeed, but one needs to look closely whether in the given context and fashion climate, and concerning the specific deliverable, it actually does. And that, in theory and in history, but also regarding the challenges we are facing today, is very well symbolized, very well presented by these three aspects of the city of Siena: the Lorenzetti frescoes, the contrade and the fate of the Monte dei Paschi. I therefore hope that my talk about them this beautiful summer day here in the Quartier Latin in Paris wasn’t too boring for you.

Thank you so much for your attention.

NOTE

This is the only minimally edited text from a recording of the keynote address at the IASIA Annual Conference, Paris, 7 July 2015, as delivered without manuscript or notes (but along a purely pictorial PowerPoint presentation), so there will be factual errors of commission and of omission. It is based on the research for Drechsler (2001, 2006), suitably updated, where references especially for the first parts can be found; for the section on the bank, see briefly, for example, Quaglia (2014) and Ewing and Piangiani (2015). I am indebted to Michiel de Vries for the invitation, to Bardhyl Dobra for the organization (both of the lecture and the publication), to Ingbert Edelhofer for the transcript and editing and to Vasilis Niaros for research support, especially with the bank part and the publication’s images. (As working with these four is always delightful, it is a particular pleasure to acknowledge this.) Funding for facilities used in this research was provided by the core infrastructure support IUT (19-13) of the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.
REFERENCES


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ABSTRACT

In this paper, the author provides a synopsis of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by world leaders in September 2015. He argues that in order for this agenda to be implemented and the goals to be achieved, countries will need to transform their public services and develop their capacity to deliver critical essential services equitable and effectively. The paper further argues that transforming the Public Service will need a transformational leadership even if transactional and even bureaucratic leadership are necessary as well. The paper also gives some aspects of what a transformed public service would look like in light of the 2030 Agenda, arguing that the characteristics of the transformed public service should be viewed in light of putting people at the centre of the Public Service operations and leaving no one behind in the provision and consumption of services.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

The deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\(^1\) agreed by world leaders in New York in September 2000, during the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations\(^2\), came and passed at the end of December 2015. The work ahead for every country developing or developed, including the international community, is to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)\(^3\) agreed and adopted by world leaders meeting in the United Nations Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda in September 2015. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, containing 17 SDGs and 169 targets, is a global one applicable to all countries irrespective of their development status. It has replaced, and is building on, the achievements of the MDGs to guide development efforts by all countries of the world for the next 15 years, beginning in January 2016. Governments, key actors and stakeholders are looking at ways to achieve a more effective balance and integration among the policies and strategies guiding the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable development, as well as the practical tools and means of implementation needed to achieve sustainable development. The key question this paper seeks to address in this respect is: what changes or, to be dramatic, what transformation in the Public Service will it take to make the Public Service effectively implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the SDGs?

There are prerequisites for achieving the SDGs. One of them is sound good governance subtended by, among other things, a capable public

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\(^1\) The Millennium Development Goals are to (i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (ii) achieve universal primary education; (iii) promote gender equality and empower women; (iv) reduce child mortality; (v) improve maternal health; (vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (vii) ensure environmental sustainability; and (viii) develop a global partnership for development.


administration with a competent public service. The implementation of the MDGs illustrates that an inadequate public administration with an incompetent public service in terms of institutional and human resources, including transactional and transformational leadership capacities, leads to insufficiency or even absence of policies and strategies at the national level, as well as to weak implementation, causing poor delivery of public services that would be vital to the achievement of global commitments such as the SDGs. Building a capable public administration with a competent public service becomes a critical objective in situations where public institutions are not able to improve and accelerate the operational capacity for public service delivery and the development of a country in general.

The question of what it will take to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the SDGs is, in this paper, discussed from the standpoint of the need to transform and develop public administration and public service capacities to achieve sustainable development. Given socio-politico-economic development challenges related to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, doing government as usual, doing public administration as usual and delivering public services as usual will not produce the desired results. There must be comprehensive changes or transformation in the Public Service to support the implementation of this agenda. First we summarize the major point of this agenda.

THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SDGS

Let us recall here the proposed 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs. The preamble of the 2030 Agenda points out five basic focus areas, which we have expanded to six: people, planet, prosperity, peace, partnership and poverty eradication. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was created for the prosperity of the people and planet and calls upon partnerships and collaboration from all countries, actors and stakeholders to engage in its implementation. Without peace,
prosperity is not achievable. Without poverty eradication, sustainable development is impossible. In Figure 1, we refer to these as the ‘six P’s’ of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; the central one being the ‘P’ for ‘people’, because the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is made by ‘we the people’, for the people, and will have to be implemented with full engagement of the people. As the political joke in the United States goes, ‘It is the people, Stupid!’ (a phrase used during President Bill Clinton’s campaign in 1992 against George Bush, to emphasize the importance of revamping the economy of the United States).

**Figure 1 – The ‘six P’s’ of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.**

The 17 goals are around three pillars (social, economic and environmental). However, given the recognition that poverty eradication is the biggest challenge facing the world, in this presentation we take poverty eradication as a fourth pillar, as indicated in Figure 2.
The Sustainable Development Goals and targets are integrated and indivisible, global in nature and universally applicable, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. Targets are defined as aspirational and global, with each government setting its own national targets guided by the global level of ambition but taking into account national circumstances. Each government will also decide how these aspirational and global targets should be incorporated into national planning processes, policies and strategies. It is important to recognize the link between sustainable development and other relevant ongoing processes in the economic, social and environmental fields.

**Figure 2 – The dimensions of sustainable development**

Sustainable development is understood to refer to three dimensions, that is, economic, social and environment development. In addition, it is agreed that poverty eradication remains the biggest development challenge facing the whole world and that without eradicating poverty in all its forms, sustainable development cannot be achieved. In many countries, the issues
related to poverty have been on the agenda for some time. Therefore, eradicating poverty is indeed a historical formidable challenge. But there are several other challenges along the path of implementing the 2030 Agenda. Here, we point out the key ones.

KEY CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Many countries are going to be confronted with various challenges of different natures and varying magnitudes, which they will need to address in order to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the SDGs: these challenges will vary according to the socio-politico-economic conditions of each country, including levels of development. It is therefore difficult, and may not even be desirable, to try to enumerate all possible challenges countries will face, as if all countries were the same. In Figure 3, we point out the basic ones which will be the core and therefore likely to be faced by all countries irrespective of the conditions of the country. They are as follows: (i) how to eradicate poverty in all its forms, (ii) how to achieve social sustainability, (iii) how to achieve environmental sustainability and (iv) how to integrate the three pillars of sustainable development and mainstream them into coherent development policies and strategies. These basic challenges point to a critical question: what are the development policy and strategy implications at national and local levels generated by the implementation of the 2030 Agenda? The policy and strategy implications are related to the four basic challenges and will require a fairly transformed public administration and public service, to be addressed. Therefore, this paper focuses on the challenge of transforming the Public Service for sustainable development.
The challenge of how to eradicate poverty

Poverty eradication is the greatest global challenge facing the world today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. The number of people in the world now living in extreme poverty has declined by more than half, falling from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. Despite this reduction in global poverty, this number represents too many people suffering poverty in a world of abundance. Moreover, in some parts of the world the situation is still serious. More than 40 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, still lived in extreme poverty in 2015 (MDG Report, 2015). This emphasizes that the challenge of eradicating poverty is still huge! It concerns inequality and inequity as well as suffering all the indignity of being regarded as poor and hopeless. And so, the very first challenge confronting sustainable development is how to eradicate poverty. As a challenge confronting government, it can prove persistent and teasing, especially where economic growth is accompanied by growth in inequalities. Where this happens, people who become less poor remain disgruntled because they turn their attention to the very rich.
Thus the problem turns into the issue of the gap between the rich and the poor rather than poverty as such.

**THE CHALLENGE OF HOW TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY**

Social sustainability can be a very ambiguous and huge undertaking because it covers almost all aspects of human life. Even poverty itself is a big social issue. To deal with ensuring social sustainability, one has to address issues related to equity and equality; social cohesion; social inclusion; shelter; education; health; youth engagement and employment; engaging the elderly; gender and advancement of women in social, economic and political life; migration; population and demographic growth; and dynamics, social diversity and so on. Each of these is a huge topic in itself and would require big policy and strategic actions to address it.

**THE CHALLENGE OF HOW TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY**

Sustaining the environment such that current generations do not create environmental conditions that will be untenable for the future generations is a complex thing and touches very much on issues of poverty eradication as well as on those related to social sustainability.

*Achieving and sustaining environmental sustainability is a challenge, especially with the emerging threat of climate change. And Africa is doing well in limiting CO2 emissions and ozone-depleting substances, yet forest cover is shrinking, and most countries struggle to meet targets on water and sanitation. To improve access to water and sanitation, countries must concentrate efforts in rural areas and low-income groups, as urban–rural income disparities in access are holding back progress.* (Africa Development Bank Working Group)
THE CHALLENGE OF HOW TO INTEGRATE AND STREAMLINE THE THREE PillARS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Then there is the teasing challenge related to how to integrate the three pillars of sustainable development and mainstream them into national and local development policies and strategies. The UN General Assembly resolution clearly states that

> the challenges and commitments contained in these major conferences and summits are interrelated and call for integrated solutions. To address them effectively, a new approach is needed. Sustainable development recognizes that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combatting inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other and are interdependent (United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1: 5)

It is understood that each pillar being treated alone is likely to be unsuccessful. But even if, to some measure, it succeeded, it would not be sustainable because any shortfalls in one pillar easily causes faults in the others. For example, the struggle against poverty by agricultural rural people can easily degrade the environment (e.g. by depleting forests and vegetation cover, causing severe soil erosion and eventually flooding and landslides in some cases). Addressing issues of the environment without addressing issues of poverty would not yield sustainable positive results.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES

The State is a critical player in the socio-politico-economic development of any country. Therefore, it is worthwhile to interrogate the role of the institutions of the State in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving the SDGs. This time around (unlike with the MDGs), the Sustainable Development Goals contain goal 16, which includes effective, inclusive and accountable institutions. However, the State is not
the only player in this. In other words, the interrogation should be formulated with four tags: what should the state do to successfully implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve SDGs? What should civil society do? What should the private sector do? And how can they collaborate and create synergy to ensure integration and harmony in sustainable development? These interrogations must be directed at the global, regional, national, local and community levels. At the community level, there may be need, in certain situations and countries, to look at the role of traditional institutions that often have a bearing on the performance and behaviour of societies. Understanding the role of institutions in sustainable development must be discussed and understood by looking at institutions at five levels:

1. The global level (e.g. the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monitory Fund, etc)
2. The regional level (e.g. the European Union, the African Union and other regional integration bodies)
3. The national level in terms of central government and public sector institutions
4. The local level in terms of local governments where governance systems are decentralized
5. The community level in terms of community-based organizations

Any of these levels acting on its own alone will not achieve sustainable development. One of the challenges related to developing institutions concerns how to ensure that all of these levels are integrated and working in synergy. Figure 4 summarizes the framework for interrogating the role of institutions in sustainable development in an integrated way, taking into account all the sectors at all levels and globally.
Achieving SDGs is at the centre, because we believe that whether it concerns poverty eradication, addressing social problems, economic problems or even saving the environment, ultimately the real results should be seen at community level in terms of achieving SDGs. A call for achieving sustainable development should include examining the institutional arrangements and capacities at each of these levels and in each of these sectors, to assess the extent to which the institutions are appropriate to support the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of
achievement of sustainable development in an inclusive and integrated manner, leaving no one behind.

GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTIONS CRITICAL TO ACHIEVING THE SDGS

First, there needs to be an effective State for sustainability of any socio-politico-economic activity, let alone achievement of SDGs, to happen. Countries that have seen their States crumble have witnessed severe suffering and can never hope to achieve SDGs without rebuilding their State and public administration/public service institutions. The most obvious way of grasping the importance and role of Government systems and institutions of the State in achieving SDGs is to look at what happens to a country/society when its state institutions get destroyed. It is good that the framers of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development from the Rio+20 Summit that took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 2012, recognized right away that good governance is critical for sustainable development. A capable state and an effective public administration/public service are indispensable for sustainable development. A capable, intelligent and effective State will work with actors in the private and civil society sectors to redefine and agree its mission and mandate as well as the challenges with which these actors are intended to concern themselves. The aspirations of the entire country in terms of socio-politico-economic development and the challenges that stand in the way to the attainment of these aspirations are analysed, diagnosed, discussed and agreed through consultations and participation of a cross section of the population. At the same time, the sharing of responsibilities and means of collaboration and participatory action among all sectors (public, private and civil society sectors) are determined. In this way, the missions of the State will be defined or redefined, understood and agreed by all the other actors. When the definition of missions is done in a participatory way, involving all sectors, chances become greater for each governance actor to know what the
others are doing and how collaboration should be approached. This also provides a reference point for the State to focus on what it can and must do.

It is equally noteworthy that the capability, intelligence and effectiveness of the State need to be seen at the various levels and in the various institutions of the State. The Legislature must be capable, intelligent and effective in its representative, legislative and oversight functions insofar as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs are concerned. The Executive must be capable, intelligent and effective in its integrated policy and strategy formulation and implementation, service delivery and performance control functions. And the Judiciary must be capable, intelligent and effective in the administration of fair accessible and equitable justice to all. Likewise, all other institutions established by the State, whether for public investment (such as public enterprises) or for accountability (such as ombudsman) must be capable, intelligent and effective in the functions for which they are established. In brief, as goal 16 of the SDGs clearly spells out, there must be effective, inclusive and accountable public institutions to drive the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. One critical public institution in this regard is the Public Service. The following sections of the paper focus on the role of the Public Service as a central component of public administration in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the SDGs.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN IMPLEMENTING THE 2030 AGENDA AND ACHIEVING SDGS

Transforming the Public Service for effective, inclusive and accountable implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the achievement of SDGs implies, first and foremost, reviewing the Public Service role in the implementation of the Agenda. Then the nature and quality of the Public Service that is required to effectively play this role can
be determined so that the transformation is driven by clear objectives. There are many things the Public Service in every country will do to implement or to facilitate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of the SDGs. We have singled out six generic ones which we consider as the most critical. These are (i) policy and strategy planning, (ii) providing services, (iii) developing infrastructure, (iv) resource mobilization and utilization, (v) monitoring and evaluation and (vi) institutional and human resource capacity development. Some of these may be outsourced, whereas others could result in severe regrets on the part of the Public Service if outsourced to private operators. Others could be partially outsourced in a collaborative arrangement between the Public Service and private operators. In this, collaboration becomes an important feature of the Public Service of the future. For example, service provision and infrastructure development can be outsourced and produce effective results if the outsourcing is well supervised.

However, it would be a bad idea for a government to outsource policy and strategy planning. Capacity development and monitoring and evaluation can be partially outsourced. There are several combinations of collaboration between private and public sector operators through which such outsourcing arrangements can be undertaken. The issue to take into consideration is that government may outsource anything else, but not its responsibility. This means that outsourcing itself requires some critical competences and talent on the part of government or public service if it has to produce the desired results. Such competences include, but are not limited to, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, professionalism, integrity, ethical conduct, communication and so on. As had already been noted well before the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was conceived,

*Public sector organisations are central to the delivery of sustainable development. Every aspect of their role – from education to environmental services, and from planning to social care – shapes how people live their lives. If public sector bodies do not take on this leadership challenge, citizens may find themselves cut off from sustainable lifestyles.* (Birney et al., 2010)
Table 1 illustrates the role of the Public Service in the achievement of the SDGs. The Public Service is expected to provide the bedrock on which all operations of all actors are anchored. When this is not provided, the whole effort of implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is jeopardized. The Public Service is, as indicated, critical. The bedrock is the rule of law and justice, observance of human rights, law and order, security of person and property, leadership, professionalism, transparency, accountability, ethical conduct and integrity. All this goes to say that the Public Service is a critical instrument for State action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achievement of SDGs. It is also a critical backbone for the action of all the other actors and stakeholders besides the government. The figure also illustrates that the Public Service is critical in integrating the 2030 Agenda and SDGs in national policies and strategies.

Table 1 – The role of the Public Service in achieving SDGs4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy and Strategy Planning</th>
<th>Providing Services</th>
<th>Infrastructure Development</th>
<th>Resource Mobilization and Utilization</th>
<th>Monitoring and Evaluation</th>
<th>Institutional and HR Capacity Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Integration of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals

4 Red = Critical, Blue = Very Important, Green = Important, Purple = Fairly Important
LINKING PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY TO ACHIEVEMENT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The delivery of public services (including services such as education, health, peace, security and safety, law and order, justice, water, energy, information, diplomacy, environment protection, housing, refuse and garbage collection, sanitation, licensing, taxation and financial mobilization, poverty eradication, etc.) is generally taken as a key function of government, even in the most private sector-oriented countries. Behind the delivery of such services are institutions, policies, laws, rules, regulations, strategies and infrastructures, which are also put in place by governments. The effectiveness of any government lies in the extent to which services of this nature are delivered with equity, responsiveness, inclusion and accountability. Looking at the 17 SDGs, literally each of them will require effectiveness of service delivery to be achieved, as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2 – SDGs and services linked to them.

| Goal 1 | End poverty in all its forms everywhere: the delivery of all services, health, education, infrastructure, information, law and order, justice, etc., contributes to fighting poverty in all its forms. |
| Goal 2 | End hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture: public services linked to this include agricultural policy, land policy, agricultural extension work, research, food security policies, food safety services, etc. |
| Goal 3 | Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages: public services linked to this include health services in general, health policy, health insurance, primary healthcare, maternal health, immunization, medical research, hospitals, health clinics, pharmaceutical, maternity, all public health services, etc. |
| Goal 4 | Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all: public services linked to this include education policies; education infrastructure, including school buildings, etc.; kindergarten centres; primary schools; and other schools up to university, teacher training; etc. |
| Goal 5 | Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls: public services linked to this include gender equality policies; education of girls; maternal healthcare; women-, land- and property-sensitive laws; etc. |
| Goal 6 | Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all: public services linked to this include provision of clean and portable water, refuse collection, sanitation services, etc. |
| Goal 7 | Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all: public service linked to this includes energy policy, electricity provision (e.g. lighting cities and villages, heating and cooling, energy research, especially for renewable energy, etc.) |
| Goal 8 | Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth; full and productive employment; and decent work for all. Services linked to this include educational services to develop a skilled employable population, economic and employment policies (we bear in mind that in many African countries public service is the biggest employer), labour laws, etc. |
| Goal 9 | Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. Public services involved include industrialisation policy; developing infrastructures, including roads, railways, telephone links, Internet infrastructures and ICT policy; research promotion, etc. |
| Goal 10 | Reduce inequality within and among countries. Public services linked to this include diplomacy, external trade promotion, etc. |
**Goal 11**  
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Public services linked to this include urban planning, urban services including urban transport, refuse collection, housing, etc.

**Goal 12**  
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.

**Goal 13**  
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. Services would include policy planning, regulation, research, etc., in all areas that concern climate change.

**Goal 14**  
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.

**Goal 15**  
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems; sustainably manage forests; combat desertification; and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

**Goal 16**  
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; provide access to justice for all; and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

**Goal 17**  
Strengthen the means of implementation, and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

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**THE NEED FOR A TRANSFORMED PUBLIC SERVICE**

It is clear that the work of the public service, especially the delivery of public services, is critical to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This makes it imperative that every government be equipped with adequate comprehensive capacities that ensure the delivery of public services. The reality, however, as the world grapples with the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is that many governments, especially in developing and least developed countries, are still short of the requisite capacities for effective delivery of public services. Yet at the same time, in light of the criticality of effective delivery of public services to the achievement of SDGs, governments are expecting the Public Service to provide more and better quality of services. As if this was not difficult enough, more and better services are expected to be provided with fewer resources. Doing more with less is being taken to a
much higher level. Success will require a comprehensive positive transformation of the Public Service.

This makes transformation and development of the capacities for the delivery of public services a critical need that must figure prominently in the strategies for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Although public sector capacity development has been on the agenda of many governments and development partners, both national and international, the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has heightened its importance. Moreover, it is necessary that the whole concept and practice of capacity development be recast to align it with the imperatives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This calls for a deep comprehensive transformation of public service. A number of questions need to be raised and answered.

The first question that rises is, what transformation must the public service undergo to be able to effectively play the critical role of implementing or facilitating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development? The second one is, how can the transformation be made? And the last one is, are there examples that can provide lessons learned and some inspiration for transforming the Public Service?

**THE TRANSFORMATION THAT THE PUBLIC SERVICE MUST UNDERGO**

Change in the Public Service is not a new phenomenon. Public service reform programs have been a feature of many countries for some time. However, public service reform has tended to focus on bureaucratic efficiency and results. We recall the three ‘E’s’ of management efficiency: effectiveness, efficiency and economy. In many respects the pursuit of bureaucratic perfection, where it succeeded, meant that government information management kept information more or less closed in; restructuring made different government units work in silos; and in general the government bureaucracy remained highly hierarchical. Public service reforms thus were inward looking. Another thing associated with public
service reforms is that in many countries, despite many resources spent on the reforms, public services did not make significant improvement, partly because challenges and objectives keep changing. The services, in some cases, did not even master bureaucratic effectiveness, let alone efficiency or economy! Therefore, public service leaders must realize that as they embark on the task of transforming the Public Service for achieving the SDGs, they are starting with a big deficit requiring that they first accomplish the job of reforming the services to make them effective and efficient.

In this light, the transformation the Public Service must undergo has to be constituted by a combination of accomplishing the reforms that have been ongoing to have effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery and a significant shift to integration, openness, citizen focus, creativity, innovation, information and communication technologies, public value, focus on outcomes, all facilitated by an empowering human resource management capacity that effectively embraces and harnesses diversity while identifying and applying highly effective incentives for creativity, innovation, transparency, accountability, ethics and professionalism (see Table 3). This will not happen unless public services are engineered and energized by a transformational leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative government, integrated planning and coordinated actions</th>
<th>A transformed Public Service for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transactional and transformational leadership across the whole public service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen-centred and people-involving service delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results-focused but more so on public value and outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethical, professional and accountable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative and innovative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapting to and harnessing new technologies, especially ICTs</td>
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<td>Empowering to public servants through capable human resources managers</td>
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<td>Continuously learning</td>
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<td>Embracing diversity and global in outlook</td>
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The Public Service in many countries is caught in a situation where it must seek a balance between the need for perfecting bureaucratic and transactional leadership and the critical necessity for shifting to transformational leadership, which is needed to transform the service into an effective machine for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The problem stems from the reality that most public services have not yet mastered bureaucratic leadership. This can be seen in the way that laws, rules, regulations, procedures and processes are often insufficiently followed or even in some cases abused, giving way to maladministration, including corruption which is endemic according to Transparency International (TI) (see Transparency International, 2015). There is need in the Public Service to adopt a multi-pronged public service leadership, with transactional and transformational leadership being in the mix. Transactional leadership is necessary to accomplish public service bureaucracy reforms for efficiency and effectiveness, and transformational leadership is needed for promoting creativity, innovation, citizen focus, collaboration, integration, future-oriented plans, partnerships and a sustained drive for outcomes and values. Although transforming our world by successfully implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will need strong transformational leadership to give impetus to everything else that is required for success, this cannot be achieved within the context of ineffective, inefficient and opaque bureaucracies in public service. Transactional leadership is still very important.
Figure 5 – The movement from traditional autocratic leadership to transformational leadership.

Value and values are closely linked. Seen through the lens of public value, the ethos and values of any public organisation, service provider or profession must be judged by how appropriate they are to the creation of value: better outcomes, services and trust. Inappropriate values may lead to the destruction of public value. (Birney et al., 2010)

Although in Figure 5 it is presented as a shift, moving from bureaucratic leadership to transformational leadership, this is for analytical purposes. In reality, the three leadership tendencies are required. Bureaucratic leadership is needed for respect of laws, rules, regulations and due process, to avoid chaotic change and maladministration. Transactional leadership is needed to sustain efficiency in the utilization of resources to avoid waste and possible misuse of resources. And transformational leadership is emphasized here to call for change and focus on values, especially in the context where outcomes, inclusiveness, equity, transparency, accountability, justices, and so on, are needed.
One of the biggest issues concerns the role of human resource managers in the Public Service in transforming the public service to make it an instrument of transformation. This clearly poses a challenge to human resource managers because it elevates what is expected of them beyond what some of them probably expect of themselves. The role of human resource managers in transforming institutional and human capacities of the Public Service can be summed up by the following four: strategy expert, work organization expert, employee champion and agent of continuous change and transformation.

*Figure 6 – Empowering and empowered public service human resource managers.*

Source: African public sector human resource managers network.
HR MANAGERS AS STRATEGY EXPERTS AND AGENTS OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT

We single out the roles of strategy expert and change agents because it is in these two roles that, if well played, can lead to transformation of institutional and human capacities in the Public Service. Those responsible for human resource management in the public service in any country needs to have at their fingertips the direction the country is planning to take in light of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the challenges it is facing and the capacity needs that it requires to overcome those challenges. Strategic planning is about being realistic in terms of analysis of challenges, problems, as well as in specifying existing and lacking institutional, human and other capacities. It is also about being optimistic in terms of future projections and outlooks. Countries need to look at and listen to themselves realistically in order to chart out the needed transformations for their development. ‘If you want to make the world a better place, take a look at yourself and make a change’ (Michael Jackson, ‘Man in the Mirror’). Any country’s fate lies in the hands and abilities of its men and women. As Cassius tells Brutus in Shakespeare’s bloody play Julius Caesar, ‘The fault [...] is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings’. Therefore, those that are charged with managing the transformers in the Public Service must be given a prominent place around the table where strategies for transforming the Public Service are formulated. This has not been the case in many countries. In most cases, strategies for public service reform have been formulated by external international consultants, without much involvement of nationals, let alone human resource managers. This needs to be corrected. The very first institutional transformation that needs to be made, then, is to provide a structural arrangement in public service that institutionally puts human resource managers in positions of strategic planners, or at least of participants in the strategic planning process, to influence the transformational shifts in the Public Service.
TRANSFORMATION THROUGH CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION

‘Governments are increasingly recognising that they cannot regulate themselves out of the problems they currently face – and that they must learn to look outwards to improve their effectiveness’ (Gash, 2016). Looking outward means also enabling creativity and innovation in the Public Service to find new solutions to emerging challenges. Different governments, different people in different places in the world, using different strategies – these are bringing about bold, rapid, applicable management innovations in governments to improve delivery of services and other government functions. From Indonesia, where the government ‘is helping citizens on the street to monitor and verify the delivery of State services’ (Maxwell and Schwarz, 2012); through Georgia, where a ‘reform minded government tries to break down silos to speed up government services’ (Renee Paradise and Ken Schwartz, September 2011); to Chicago in the United States, engaging people in the planning and budgeting process – participatory budgeting (‘Participatory Budgeting in Chicago’) – governments are under pressure to transform the way they deliver public services. This pressure will increase, especially for the developing world, with the urgency of achieving the SDGs. The transformation will continue to take place in countries that encourage creativity and innovation in the Public Service. Looking at innovations in different countries, one becomes curious about the factors that explain the success in innovation in the Public Service.

As Figure 7 makes clear, it is clear that creativity and innovation are unlikely to take place, let alone succeed, in a context where top leadership does not encourage and support them, where there is no or little incentive or rewards for individuals who are creative and who come up with useful innovations, where experimentation and evaluation are discouraged, where learning from outside is not encouraged and where the value in diversity of the human resource is not tapped. Transformational leadership is needed to harness such innovation success factors to transform the Public Service and make it a sharp tool for implementing the 2030 Agenda and for achieving the SDGs.
One of the prominent personalities who tried to transform the public sector is Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Figure 8 lists the five lessons he learned in the process of this transformation. The first one is that one has to aim for systemic change rather than ad hoc piecemeal change. The second is that to succeed in transformation, one must do the right conceptual analysis. The third is that transformation must have people’s interest and well-being at the centre because, more than anything else, people matter in the transformation of the Public Service.

Transformation has to be for the people and must be undertaken with the engagement and ownership of the people. The fourth lesson is that governments can and should learn from one another as one of the ways of inspiring transformation. The fifth lesson is that governance needs to be seen as government effectiveness, in this case in the delivery of public services that matter in the lives of people.
CONCLUSION

The pursuit, with relative success, of the Millennium Development Goals did not eradicate poverty, nor did it eradicate inequality. As the world embarks on the second leg constituted by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, and with world leaders acknowledging that poverty eradication is the greatest challenge facing the world, all actors need to recast their thinking on how differently they need to work and what different actions they need to take in order to register greater and better achievements, this time leaving no one behind. The Public Service, being a critical actor, therefore needs to undergo transformation in its ideological outlook (especially if it has to contribute to eradicating inequality and leave no one behind in access and consumption of essential services) and its structural arrangement (if it has to be inclusive and collaborative); it must be creative and innovative (if it has to bring new
ways of service delivery), open, professional, and highly ethical and accountable to be able to maximize outcome from the available meagre resources. Such a transformation in the Public Service will have to be initiated and sustained by a transformational leadership with very capable, empowering human resource managers in the Public Service. All transformation measures must be preceded by risk analysis balancing risk and realism. While transforming policy to pursue those policies that will adequately address the 2030 Agenda and SDGs is critical, it is equally critical that transforming policy be coupled with rigorous implementation. Priority for transformation should be what really matters for the people in terms of results and outcomes. Research and think tanks, including universities and MDIs for analysis and innovation incubation must be used for transformation.

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Institutional Development beyond the Crisis: The Public Decisions in Brazil
An Analysis from Within by Bianor Scelza Cavalcanti and Guilherme R. Garcia Marques
INTRODUCTION

The grave context of the economic and political crisis of Brazil has caught the attention of many various media throughout the world. Economic imbalances are associated with political factors in a situation so dramatic and self-reinforcing that many national and international analysts came to believe in the complete paralysis of the country, given the profound institutional difficulties that have emerged since the end of 2014.

This article seeks, first, to consider the roots of the current crisis in order to then identify, through an analysis of the performance and activities of inspection and control institutions responsible for combating illicit practices in the public sphere, the extent to which important advances have been developed within this critical period. In summary, it attempts to answer whether, in fact, signs of paralysis do exist at the level of institutional dynamics, or whether it is possible to observe advances that will permit the country to emerge stronger at the end of this process.

Understanding the details of this context and its respective advances becomes essential for Brazil to be able to see, in the current crisis, opportunities to continue fostering important institutional developments such as those which have been presented during recent years.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

To comprehend the situation of economic crisis currently under way in Brazil assumes the understanding of a number of political decisions taken in the face of unfavourable external and internal factors, such as the strong global economic downturn, the decline of international trade and the exhaustion of an internal consumption cycle based on the increase of employment, income and credit. These have resulted in the reversal of a fruitful and beneficial economic dynamic that was characterized by the strong growth of international prices of commodities along with the
adoption of important social policies,\(^1\) especially during the period from 2004–11 (Figure 1).

**Figure 1 – Brazilian trade indicators (2011–15, US$ billions).**
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) (2016) and Trading Economics (2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Capacity utilization rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>29,79</td>
<td>19,438</td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>19,681</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>-3,959</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
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<td>19,681</td>
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</tbody>
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In an effort to boost economic growth in the face of this cyclic slowdown, since 2012, the administration of President Dilma Rousseff has intensified the adoption of policies designed to stimulate private investment through the implementation of tax exemption measures and tax subsidies in specific economic sectors.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) For example the structuring of income transfer programs (Bolsa Família) and a policy of keeping increases to the minimum wage above those of inflation.

\(^2\) Among such measures, we can highlight (i) reductions in payroll costs; (ii) reduction in the basic food basket tax; (iii) reduction of the tax on industrialized products; (iv) new tax levels for individual small businesses; (v) reduction of the tax on financial operations for individual credit operations; and (vi) tax reductions for exporting companies and for the capital goods industry.
Such tax incentives effectively began during the administration of President Luiz Inácio da Silva (2003–10) – more specifically as part of a broad strategy aimed at the need to stimulate the country’s economic development, thus compensating for the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the intensification of tax relief measures and fiscal subsidies carried out during the Rousseff administration led to waiving the collection of taxes equivalent to R$ 457.96 billion – an amount ten times larger than that of the Lula administration, estimated to have been R$ 43.5 billion (Figure 2).

**Figure 2 – Tax waivers of the Dilma Rousseff administration**

3 (R$ billions).

Source: Receita Federal (2016)

The combination of this fiscal policy with stagnation and the subsequent decline in economic activity and its negative impacts on tax collections,

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3 Tax waivers scheduled for 2016, 2017 and 2018 (*) are estimates generated from the measures announced by the government since 2013, effective for the subsequent years.
coupled with a significant increase in real interest rates\(^4\) – which went from 7.25 per cent, in 2013 to 14.25 per cent in 2015 – caused a substantial increase of public debt interest costs.\(^5\) This contributed largely to the deterioration of public sector accounts, which in 2014 presented a primary deficit of R$ 32.5 billion, the first negative result since 2001 (Figure 3).

**Figure 3 – Private sector primary result (2010–15).**
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2016).

This deterioration would lead the newly re-elected Rousseff administration to redirect its economic policy through execution of a fiscal adjustment put in place shortly after the completion of the most fiercely

\(^4\) Seeking to combat inflationary pressures and to attract foreign capital.

\(^5\) That totalled R$ 368 billion in the year 2015, compared to R$ 288.2 billion in 2014. Such interest costs weighed heaviest in the increase of public debt in 2015, with a total of R$ 498 billion.
contested presidential election since the re-democratization of 1989. This adjustment resulted in cutting 29 per cent of public investment during 2015 – a cut that would total R$177.4 billion, or 2.9 per cent of GDP – taking it to the lowest level since 2007.

Other characteristics of this pro-cyclic economic policy include the readjustment of frozen rates and abrupt foreign exchange rate devaluation. These measures, along with the significant reduction in public investment – which in itself has a strong multiplier effect on private investment – resulted in a strong acceleration of inflationary indices, a sharp decline of economic activity, a fall in GNP and a decline in confidence rates of entrepreneurs and consumers (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Given the subsequent impacts on tax collections resulting from the deceleration of the economy, the result of 2015, with a primary deficit of R$ 111.2 billion, was even worse than that of 2014.

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6 Dilma Rousseff, of the Workers Party (PT), would be re-elected in the second round with 51.64 per cent of votes compared to 48.36 per cent for Aécio Neves of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB).
7 This figure was arrived at by adding together all spheres of government and state-owned companies. Given that 90 per cent of government expenditures are mandatory – for example continued duration payments such as those for personnel, social programs, social security benefits, constitutional transfers to states and municipalities, etc., thus hindering the implementation of structural fiscal reforms, the tax cut decisions would focus on the remaining 10 per cent classified as ‘discretionary spending’, which includes the public investment.
8 These consist of measures taken between 2013 and 2014 in order to contain inflationary surges. Included are a series of public utility rates, from water to electricity.
9 This entailed a 32.9 percent drop against the dollar, the world’s second largest loss in 2015.
Figure 4 – GDP and inflation (2012–15, % quarterly).
Source: Formulated based on data available in Trading Economics.

Figure 5 – Confidence index of entrepreneurs and consumers (2012–16).
Source: Formulated based on data available in Trading Economics.
Therefore, the fiscal adjustment, instead of reversing the deterioration of public accounts, as it was promoted, resulted in an even greater decline in economic activity and of tax collections, accentuating the imbalance of the existing public accounts and opening the way to new rounds of contraction of consumer spending and investment. To this critical situation were added as well the perverse economic effects resulting from Operation Car Wash\(^ {10} \) that paralyzed large and dynamic sectors of total investment of the economy such as the chains of petroleum, gas and construction.\(^ {11} \)

We should point out, however, that the current crisis reveals structural problems that are not restricted merely to the imbalance of public accounts. The process of de-industrialization of Brazil had already started in the 1990s (Figure 6).\(^ {12} \) It made the Brazilian economy increasingly dependent on the commodity sector, and thus increasingly vulnerable to international price volatility (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). In this sense, the reversion of the favourable external situation in the period 2004–11, together with economic policy mistakes of the Rousseff administration, led to economic, trade and fiscal imbalances becoming even worse.

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\(^ {10} \) This is an ongoing investigation carried out by the Federal Police of Brazil. Its first ostensive phase occurred on 17 March 2014, with the delivery of more than 100 warrants for search and seizure, temporary imprisonment, preventive imprisonment and bench warrants, with the purpose of unravelling an enormous scheme of money laundering and pay-offs. It is considered by the Federal Police as the largest federal corruption investigation in the history of the country, covering a large number of entrepreneurs and politicians from various parties.

\(^ {11} \) The total sum of investments in these sectors account for almost 5 per cent of GDP in a country where the overall level of gross fixed capital formation ranges in recent years between 15 and 18 per cent.

\(^ {12} \) De-industrialization occurred as a result of measures such as (i) low investment, (ii) strong increases in the foreign exchange rate, (iii) high interest rates, and (iv) unbraked trade liberalization implemented in the 1990s. The combination of these factors flooded the domestic market with imported goods, triggering the process of de-industrialisation of the Brazilian economy (Bresser-Pereira, 2010).
Beyond the bad economic results – a recession of 3.8 per cent in 2015, a trend which should persist also in 2016, two other problems deepened the crisis, transcending it to the political sphere. These were the outbreak of corruption scandals linked to the Workers Party and other members of its ruling base,\textsuperscript{13} and the practice of ‘accounting masking’, through which the Rousseff administration delayed the transfer of funds to public banks responsible for the executive operation of social programs, with the alleged intention of softening the government's fiscal indicators.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} These were the Progressive Party (PP) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Such scandals relate to crimes such as money laundering, payment of bribes and illegal financing of political campaigns.

\textsuperscript{14} This happens because although social spending effectively occurred, it had not yet been accounted for in the accounts of the federal government when it published its annual report. Thus, this artifice can be used to increase the primary surplus or, in this case, to prevent a larger primary deficit.
Such budgetary operations, not provided for in the constitution, have been criticized by sectors opposed to the government as a kind of federal government funding by public banks, a practice strictly forbidden by the Law of Fiscal Responsibility, and therefore used to justify the opening of the impeachment process currently in course in Congress. The administration, in turn, justified the implementation of these budgetary operations based on the argument that they had been used in previous administrations without any impediment.

Figure 7, restricted to the payment of unemployment insurance, confirms the indubitable recurrence of these accounting operations during the period 2000–14. On the other hand, it highlights as well the substantial increase in the amount also practised by the Rousseff administration, especially in the last two years of its first term. This trend would persist in 2015, when the practice of accounting masking totalled R$ 40 billion, the same value occurring in the previous year (Cruz, 2015).

**Figure 7 – Accounting masking - unemployment insurance (2000-14).**

These accounting operations, associated with the opening of six additional credits in 2015 without proper authorization of the National Congress, strengthened the impeachment process currently underway. Despite the absence of unanimous agreement concerning the allegations found in the impeachment opinion, and even in relation to the impeachment itself, it is important to highlight that the opening of this process has strong social support: 68 per cent support the removal of the president (Datafolha, 2016).

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the political inconsistencies expressed in the course of the evolution of the process of impeachment of President Rousseff,15 Brazil has shown important institutional progress related to the exercise of political control of citizens over the actions of the government. These are advances that can be verified from constitutional principles and complementary and ordinary legislation grounded in Constitution of 1988, and which have been widely implemented in the current scenario of economic and political crisis.

Such advances, upon instrumentalizing the concept by direct and indirect means of supervision, expose a complex relationship between society and public officials; that is to say, between ‘principal’ and ‘agent’, demonstrating the delegation of authority and responsibility from the first to the second, enabling the latter to act. Such action, however, must be strictly subject to accountability, lato e stritu senso, from the ‘agent’ to the ‘principal’, so that the latter benefits directly when the former performs its tasks with rigor (Posner, 2000). Such a relationship acts as a protection of

15 Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), president of the Chamber of Deputies and responsible for the acceptance of the request for impeachment in the Chamber, is accused by the Car Wash Operation of having committed crimes of corruption and money laundering; Antonio Anastasia (PSDB), rapporteur of the impeachment process in the Senate, have signed 972 decrees for supplementing the budget and increasing primary expenses when he was governor of the State of Minas Gerais, not complying with the fiscal targets set out in the Budget Guidelines Law; the opening of the impeachment process has confused important steps of the rite, such as the completion of the technical analysis by the Court of Auditors in relation to 2015 accounts and the consideration of this judgment by the National Congress.
the rights of the citizen against the uses and abuses of power by the government as a whole, by any individual vested with a public function.

Fundamental mechanisms were established for the control of government actions relating to aspects of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness, as they pertain to examining:

1. how public agencies and entities acquire, protect, and utilize their resources;
2. the causes of anti-economic and inefficient practices;
3. the fulfillment of foreseen goals; and
4. the impact of governmental programs, projects and activities in the sense of seeking to discover the extent to which actions implemented are able to produce the effects intended by the administration.

Among such mechanisms are the activities of the Federal Accounting Tribunal, an institution defined within the Federal Constitution for carrying out national accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and asset control and of direct and indirect administration entities, to control the application of subsidies and changes of use of fiscal resources, and to aid the National Congress in annual fiscal and budgetary planning.

Regarding the budget operations carried out during the first mandate of the Rousseff administration, it is valid to point out that the Federal Accounting Tribunal would have alerted the president about irregularities in the 2013 accounts (Amora, 2015). This is in compliance with its duties in regard to the control of public accounts for the sake of obtaining higher degrees of transparency and governability.

In turn, as regards to combating corruption within the federal executive branch, the Federal Comptroller General’s Office has played an important role in fostering the defence of public assets. It was created in 2001 and has among its main functions internal control, public auditing, the formulation of policies for preventing and combating corruption, and increasing the transparency of management within the federal public administration. This institution has fulfilled its role with the opening of

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16 These subsidies constitute monetary aid, in general conceded by government.
administrative and accountability processes against a number of companies related to corruption scandals under the Car Wash Operation.

Such processes can both prevent the signing of new contracts with the public sector, as well as result in the application of fines or other appropriate penalties, thus contributing to abolish the strongly rooted view in Brazilian society in regard to total impunity within the structures of government.

These efforts are reflected in the substantial number of expulsions of public servants during the period from 2003–15, including firing, seizure of retirement benefits and dismissal of appointed individuals in commissioned functions (Figure 8).

**Figure 8 – Federal Public Administration – expulsion penalties applied to public servants (2003-15)**
Source: Controladoria Geral da União (2016).
Another significant initiative by the Federal Comptroller General’s Office is the Transparency Portal,¹⁷ a website launched in November 2004 with the aim of increasing the transparency of public administration and allowing citizens to monitor the use of public resources, thus contributing to its task of supervision in regard to their good and correct application.

Activities of the Federal Prosecutor Department, created in 1993 as a permanent institution essential to the jurisdictional function of the state, responsible for the defence of the judicial order and of the democratic regime, have been equally fundamental. Its broad attributions make it a key institution for starting investigations of accounting practices committed by the Rousseff administration – and by state governments – within the purview of Operation Car Wash, in which it has denounced politicians and entrepreneurs for crimes of corruption, racketeering and money laundering.¹⁸ As of December 2015, 1016 operations have been carried out, with 396 searches and seizures, 40 plea bargain agreements awarded individuals and five leniency agreements with companies (Ministério Público Federal, 2016).

The Federal Prosecutor Department also exercises the important role of promoting transparency and dissemination of information through the launching of a website about developments in Operation Car Wash.¹⁹ It provides detailed data on the progress of the operation in course, as well as full texts of the complaints lodged, judgments handed down and news articles, among other documents, having already surpassed the mark of 1 million Internet hits.

Also related to combating corruption is the professional and institutional strengthening of the Federal Police. Its number of employees jumped from 7431 police in 2003 to 11,817 in 2014, an increase of 59 per cent over the

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¹⁷ http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/.
¹⁸ These entailed 36 criminal accusations against 170 people for crimes of corruption, racketeering and asset laundering, among others. The crimes involve the payment of kickbacks of nearly R$ 6.4 billion, R$ 2.8 billion of which have been retrieved by federal prosecutors who also requested in courts the reimbursement of R$ 14.5 billion (Ministério Público Federal, 2016).
¹⁹ For more information, see http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/.
period, while the institution’s expenses have grown by 40 per cent since 2003, discounted for inflation. Its central role in the conduct of Operation Car Wash, through the blockage and seizure of goods totalling R$ 2.4 billion, the repatriation of R$ 659 million and the serving of more than 800 judicial orders – for search and seizure, coercive testimony and imprisonment – has contributed to raising important popular support for the operation and to combating corruption in Brazil (Polícia Federal, 2016; Souza and Onofre, 2016).

Operation Car Wash uncovered spurious relationships between private companies and the government through the private financing of election campaigns, the payment of kickbacks and the granting of favours in public bidding. This resulted in the Federal Supreme Court declaring the private financing of candidates and political parties unconstitutional. In the future, they are only allowed to receive donations from private individuals, limited to up to 10 per cent of their income during the previous year.

The end of the private financing of campaigns, associated with increased inspection and control seeking to prevent illegal financing, will open the path toward diminishing the strict relation of influence between companies and politicians. Studies calculate that companies that financed Labour Party candidates to the Federal Chamber of Deputies during the 2006 elections received between 14 and 39 times the value donated through government contracts in subsequent years (Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson, 2014: 415). Similarly, this measure will bring greater balance between parties and candidates, including those who refuse to receive private funding from certain economic sectors, strengthening the functioning and the stability of the democratic regime.

An essential step for the stability of this system is free and transparent access to public information, a precondition for citizen engagement and of organized groups of society in political processes and in the management of public affairs. Asymmetries of information tend to lead to deficient social control, both in the dimension of choosing the best candidate as well as in the dimension of punishing conduct deviations. In this sense, important
advances have been made from the promulgation in 2011 of the Information Access Law,\textsuperscript{20} such as the initiatives for the release of official data by institutions such as the Comptroller General’s Office and Federal Prosecutor Department. By these means, one expects greater citizen engagement in the successive cycles of public choice, based on information that nourishes decision-making processes in the common interest.

Thus, transparency assumes the role of an antidote against corruption, structuring itself as an inducement for public managers to act with responsibility, so that armed with information, society can collaborate in the control of the actions of its governors in order to verify the real application of public resources as well as the results achieved through their use.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the serious context of the political crisis in Brazil undermines the ability to identify and execute proposals and reforms needed to resolve the economic crisis, and this, in turn, contributes directly to the worsening political crisis, it is also clear that the country is showing great institutional capacity to identify and punish misdeeds.

In doing so, it strengthens Brazilian structural and institutional dimensions: firstly, by reorienting the way of doing business and dealing with public-private partnerships, and secondly, by contributing to ensuring that the next governments should consider the fiscal and budgetary responsibility with a new – and even unprecedented – attention. Finally, it lays the foundation for a new way of doing politics in the country, one that is more transparent, accountable and focused on the common good.

It is necessary, however, to caution that no political inconsistencies block the progress expected and desired. Decisions taken in order to impede the autonomy and political independence of these control and

\textsuperscript{20} It seeks to guarantee Brazilian citizens broad access to official data of the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
punishment instruments in case of failure to execute legitimate guidelines will only lead to the weakening of the democratic ideal, exposing the whole society to the potential risks of its bureaucracy.

Although ensuring the autonomy and independence of these institutions is important, it is just as important to lay the foundation for economic and political reforms that allow Brazil to overcome its internal distortions, preparing the country for the challenges of the twenty-first century and for a new cycle of robust growth. Needed are reforms in taxes, budgetary, political and educational areas that contribute directly to the economic and social development.

Finally, we must keep in mind that the progress made and addressed above does not necessarily result from a particular government or political party, but mainly from dynamics between politics and society. This dynamic has already been beneficial for the transformation of public administration in the country, which was forced to professionalize and to accept greater levels of control and pressure for results.

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Quality of Life and Satisfaction with Public Services in Qatar: Qataris versus Expatriates’ Perspectives
A Research Note by Nada Abdelkader Benmansour

ABSTRACT

How to explain a negative relation between satisfaction with life and satisfaction about public service delivery? In Qatar, non-citizens are much more positive about public service delivery than citizens, but citizens are more satisfied about life in general than non-citizens. This article assesses the level of satisfaction with public services and life satisfaction in Qatar for citizens and non-citizens and empirically investigates the associated factors.

Dissatisfaction with basic public services, such as health, education, transport, electricity and other types of government services, grew in many MENA countries in the years prior to the Arab Spring. In these countries, life satisfaction was very low, and people in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen were among the least happy people in the world.

Living in Qatar, a country with one of the world’s highest per capita incomes, does not secure life satisfaction, as the relation between income and life satisfaction is more complex than it seems. Qatar has a high rate of population growth and a high migrant population.
INTRODUCTION

Experience with public services influences how citizens evaluate their own quality of life in the sense that high-quality public services drive a high quality-of-life rating. Rose and Newton (2010) show how a person’s quality of life, as well as how she perceives her own quality of life, is shaped, among other things, by the public services available and the standard in which they are delivered. If provision of public services is of a high standard, quality of life is improved and positively perceived by citizens.

Research on citizen satisfaction has explained the variance in evaluations of public services by some non-service-related factors such as socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (Brown and Coulter, 1983; Stipak, 1977).

Qatar has one of the fastest growing and highest migrant populations in the world (World Bank, 2014). More than 80 per cent of the population consists of non-nationals (Gulf Migration, 2010–15), and in 2013, 31.2 per cent of foreign workers in Qatar were from India, 23.5% from Nepal, 11.4 per cent from Philippines and 10.1 per cent from Arab countries (De Bel-Air, 2014). How satisfied is the general population with the public services? What are the public services people are most/least satisfied with? And what are the drivers of satisfaction for the general population and for the different subgroups of the population, citizens and non-citizens?

We use Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) data to answer these questions, assess the factors of satisfaction in Qatar and compare satisfaction rates of citizens and non-citizens.1 The results show that utilities and administration are the public services people are most satisfied with, whereas roads and education are found to be the least satisfying. There also seems to be a discrepancy in rates of satisfaction between citizens and non-citizens, with the latter being overall more satisfied with public services than are citizens. Interestingly, though they are

1 ‘Citizen and Resident Satisfaction with Public Services in Qatar’, SESRI, Qatar University.
less satisfied with public services, citizens still tend to be more satisfied than non-citizens with the quality of life in Qatar.

SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES

The literature shows that citizens’ attitudes are affected by some non-service-related factors such as the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. The most significant effects are those generated by race, age and socio-economic status (Brown and Coulter, 1983; Stipak, 1977). Many studies in American cities, involving different municipal services, show a lower satisfaction rate among African Americans and Hispanics compared to Anglo-Americans. Less consistently, age has been correlated to findings, in that younger respondents are more critical of municipal services. Socio-economic status, defined by education and income, has not produced any statistically significant effect (Brown and Coulter, 1983). A few studies examined the relationship between objective service conditions and the level of citizens’ satisfaction with municipal services, with fewer notable results (Stipak, 1974; Carroll, 1978). In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, studies focused on satisfaction with one specific public sector rather than general satisfaction with public services (Aday and Walker, 1996; Shafi and Weerakkody, 2009; Ali, Nikoloski and Reka, 2015). Nationality (citizens vs non-citizens), socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics are found to be significant determinants of satisfaction. McGivern (1999) and Ali, Nikoloski and Reka (2015) found an important difference between citizens and non-citizens regarding the quality of the healthcare system in Qatar, with non-citizens being significantly more satisfied.

We asked a representative sample of citizens and non-citizens2 about their level of satisfaction with K–12 education, university education, healthcare services, administration, infrastructure/roads, utilities and cultural services. In particular, three questions were asked relating to (i)

2 Respondents are expatriates (or spouses) earning QR4000 or more per month.
overall satisfaction with services, (ii) frequency of use and (iii) expectations towards the services. We asked respondents to rate public services on a 10-point scale, with 0 denoting the lowest rating and 10 the highest (French ‘Kit de Satisfaction’ from the Government Modernization; Van Ryzin, 2004). We use SESRI data collected through a telephone survey in September 2015. The survey employs a scientifically grounded sampling of 1485 citizens and non-citizens 18 years of age and older, living throughout the country. Figure 1 shows the overall satisfaction with public services for the general population in Qatar. There seems to be general consensus from the population that the most satisfying public services are utilities (electricity and water) and public administration (public service agencies, municipalities, etc.), while the least satisfying are roads and K–12 education.

**Figure 1 – Average satisfaction with public services.**

![Average satisfaction with public services](image)

Previous studies related to healthcare services in GCC countries found a consistent variance in satisfaction among citizens and non-citizens (Ali,
Nikoloski and Reka, 2015). In general, according to our sample, Qataris tend to be less satisfied than Arab expatriates, but more satisfied than Western expatriates.

To understand the variance in satisfaction between citizens and non-citizens, we assessed the influence of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics on satisfaction, using a regression model. Results of the regression are presented in Figure 2 and show a statistically significant effect of citizen satisfaction with public services: citizens tend to be less satisfied than non-citizens. Also, when looking at differences between nationalities, we observe a significant difference between Qataris, Arabs and Western expatriates. Arabs are the most satisfied and Westerners the least satisfied. Age and education are found to be

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3 ‘Citizen and Resident Satisfaction with Public Services in Qatar’, SESRI, Qatar University.
predictors of satisfaction, with younger and more educated respondents being less satisfied with public services. We asked respondents about their frequency of using public services and found a positive correlation between usage and satisfaction. But when we compare citizens to non-citizens, we discovered a negative relationship between usage and satisfaction for non-citizens. We find only weak evidence that income explains satisfaction with public services. In general, these results are consistent, in terms of significance, with the main studies related to satisfaction in Qatar (Ali, Nikoloski and Reka, 2015; Aday and Walker, 1996; McGivern, 1999).

QUALITY OF LIFE IN MENA COUNTRIES

It is argued that life satisfaction is related to evaluation of individual life concerns. The greater the satisfaction with such life concerns, the greater the satisfaction with life in general. Indeed, the surrounding environment and quality of public services have a strong influence on how people evaluate their own quality of life. The idea is that effective and quality public services will have a positive impact on citizens’ overall quality of life (Rose and Newton, 2010). Indeed, satisfaction with community resources such as public schools, medical care and government services is assumed to be predictive of the general satisfaction of the quality of life (Sirgy, Rahtz, Cicic and Underwood, 2000).

In this survey, we asked respondents several question related to their quality of life in Qatar. We asked them to rate the State of Qatar as a place to live, on a 1–10 scale, where 1 is ‘very bad’ and 10 is ‘the best place’.

We observe that, in general, citizens and non-citizens tend be more satisfied with the quality of life in Qatar if they are satisfied with the quality of public services, consistent with previous studies (Rose and Newton, 2010). But because Qatar’s population is very heterogenic due to the high influx of migrant workers, we assume different trends among non-citizens. Indeed, we observe the strongest effect for Westerners, who seem to be the most sensitive to life satisfaction. On the other hand, the effect is weakest for citizens, as there seems to be no relationship between their satisfaction
with public services and their life satisfaction. This can be explained by a patriotic feeling on the part of citizens and a more critical view by Western non-citizens, who might be more concerned with interesting professional and financial opportunities than with the quality of life.

**Figure 3 – Levels of satisfaction with public services and quality of life.**

![Levels of satisfaction with public services and quality of life](image)

**POLICY IMPLICATION**

Analysis of satisfaction with public services and life satisfaction in Qatar, a country with one of the world’s highest per capita incomes, shows that high income does not necessarily indicate life satisfaction. Analysis reveals lower satisfaction with public services, but a higher life satisfaction for citizens compared to non-citizens. Also, it shows significant discrepancy among non-citizens, with Arabs tending to be more satisfied than Westerners.

In this context, a deeper analysis of the most and least satisfying public services is required to discern factors associated with (dis)satisfaction.
Further analysis of citizens’ and non-citizens’ needs and expectations vis-à-vis public services will help policymakers design satisfying public services, thus ensuring they are of high quality and efficient, and will help towards achieving Qatar National Vision 2030 ‘for social progress, human development, a sound and diversified economy and a sustainable environment’.

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### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Nada Abdelkader Benmansour received her PhD in economics from the University of Paris 1 La Sorbonne in 2008. Her research areas are Economics of Public Services, New Public Management, Public Services, Quality, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). Before joining the SESRI, Dr. Benmansour was involved in a NPRP project entitled “Qatarization, the Human Resource Challenge” as project manager and research associate. She was lecturer in economics and management in Tunisia.
The Dynamics of Failing Service Delivery in Nigeria and Ghana
A PhD Research Note by Mary S. Mangai

ABSTRACT

This article compares the quality of service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana in the areas of healthcare, food provision and access to clean water and sanitation. Its first finding is that public service delivery in the two countries has been perceived as inadequate and deteriorating for over a decade. Therefore, this paper concludes that Nigeria and Ghana are lagging behind in the provision of basic public services for their citizens and need to re-orient their service delivery. Governments in sub-Saharan countries are working with donor agencies at the forefront of combating poverty through a number of interventions to improve the delivery of public services. Notwithstanding these good intentions, few results have been achieved so far, especially considering the massive investment made in attempts to reduce poverty in this region.

The outcomes of this research suggest a strong relationship between household satisfaction and problems experienced in service delivery in these areas. They also show that satisfaction with public service delivery involves more than government performance. Political, geographical and demographic factors are also important predictors.
INTRODUCTION

Research on the expectations of citizens with regard to public service delivery and their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with poverty intervention services in sub-Saharan Africa is said to be rare and much needed (Bold et al., 2011; Fiszbein, 2005), even though basic service delivery is fundamental to economic development and well-being (Bold et al., 2010; World Bank, 2003). Governments in sub-Saharan countries are working with donor agencies at the forefront of combating poverty through a number of interventions to improve public service delivery, but few results have been achieved so far, especially considering the massive investment made in attempts to reduce poverty in these regions (Bold et al., 2010; Wessal, Treuth and Wescott, 2014).

One might argue that the challenges – and therefore also the potential solutions – of service delivery in these developing countries are similar to service delivery issues in economically developed countries and that theories on citizen satisfaction which explain customer satisfaction and quality of private/public service delivery in more developed countries should apply equally to public service delivery in developing countries. After all, it is still service delivery, no matter who provides it or where it is provided. Although such an argument is appealing because it allows researchers to use the proxy of citizen satisfaction with service delivery as indicative of the quality of actual public service delivery in developing countries (in the same way that this proxy is used in developed countries), a rather different argument assumes significant differences between the challenges in public and private service delivery. This argument contends that these differences vary between developed and developmental countries because in the latter, specific socio-economic, demographic and political factors impede service delivery.

The first factor that would appear to justify this argument is the lack of equity in public service delivery in developing countries. Although it is the wish of governments and donor agencies that their interventions in such countries will reach the poor, the reality remains very different. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is often only the wealthy and privileged that have access
to high-quality products and services. Most often, such services are acquired from high-cost private sector providers or are purchased abroad. Citizens in these countries, especially the poor, are concerned about what their government is doing and should do to resolve this problem and the gap between their expectations and their experiences (Bold et al., 2011; Fiszbein, 2005).

A second factor concerns the limited quality of public service delivery in such countries, especially for certain societal groups and regions, because politicians seek to satisfy those societal groups and regions that are the most important for their re-election: the wealthy and those living in urban areas (Cazares, Mok and Petrovsky, 2013).

This article examines the relationship between the problems experienced and the satisfaction with public sector services in the fields of water, sanitation, healthcare and food provision in Ghana and Nigeria. It aims to address the gap in knowledge on service delivery in Ghana and Nigeria and to examine whether trends and variations in actual service delivery and levels of satisfaction with such services are related to socio-economic, demographic and political factors. This article does this firstly by comparing the problematic situation regarding service delivery in these countries at the macro level. Secondly, it investigates the relationship between the problems experienced with service delivery and satisfaction with public services at the micro level. This aspect of the research is based on surveys from the Afrobarometer, including indicators relating to service provision, citizen satisfaction with the quality and accessibility of public goods and data on their opinions on government performance.

This article sets out to answer the following questions:

• What can be said about the relationship between problems experienced with public service delivery and the satisfaction of citizens with service delivery in Ghana and Nigeria?

• To what extent do satisfaction with service delivery and views on government performance in general vary according to socio-economic group, demographic group and political context – such as younger and older sections of the population, gender, employment status and urban versus rural areas – in Ghana and Nigeria?
The next section provides some background information on Nigeria and Ghana. Comparing Nigeria and Ghana allows this article to address the macro-level factors that are important in delivering public services. Subsequently, an analysis at the household level is presented, based on survey data. Studying variations and trends by combining analysis on the household and the contextual levels in Nigeria and Ghana adds to the knowledge on government performance in sub-Saharan Africa from the macro and micro perspectives. The next section addresses the dataset used and the methods of analysis. The final section presents the outcomes of the analysis, which is followed by a discussion and conclusions.

**BACKGROUND ON NIGERIA AND GHANA**

As West African countries, Nigeria and Ghana share some features due to their geographical proximity, colonial history, long-term military rule, ethnic heterogeneity, recent transitions to democracy and similar levels of development. Nigeria is a special case, as it is the most populous country in Africa (180 million people) and has a strong regional influence in sub-Saharan Africa. This influence is particularly due to the country’s macroeconomic characteristics, military interventions and the size of its economy (Lewis, 2003). For instance, Lewis (2003: 132) observes that if democracy were to succeed in Nigeria, this would increase the chances of greater democracy in other sub-Saharan countries.

In terms of economic growth, both Nigeria and Ghana have made progress in the last decade (see Table 2). Another enabling factor for service delivery is that both countries are governed by democratically elected leaders. Theoretically, this would imply that their governments would do their best to improve governance, accountability and performance in the field of public service delivery, because the populace expects quality improvements in this area, and politicians’ re-election chances may depend on it (Cazares et al., 2013; Joseph, 2014; Wessal et al., 2014).

Economic growth and political democracy are, despite the arguments often articulated in the political speeches of international actors concerning
their positive effects on poverty alleviation, not sufficient to reduce poverty on their own; how the poor fare in the wake of poverty alleviation programmes, economic growth and emerging democracy remains an under-investigated area (Wessal et al., 2014). The relationship between these developments is especially dubious in Nigeria and Ghana: this becomes clear when one contrasts the economic growth and the emergence of democracy with the enduring poverty among the populations of these countries and the lack of good education, basic healthcare and access to basic utilities such as clean drinking water. Although several programmes and interventions on poverty alleviation have been introduced since the emergence of democracy and the take-off of economic growth in these countries, poverty rates are still very high (NBS, 2012; Wessal et al., 2014). Statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of Nigeria show that in 2004, 54.7 per cent of Nigerians lived in absolute poverty. This figure increased to 60.9 per cent in 2010 and 69.9 per cent in 2012. A recent NBS report showed that 120 million of the total 180 million Nigerians survive on a daily income of less than $1.25, which is the international poverty line (NBS, 2012).

Poverty remains a serious multidimensional problem in both countries, and this is reflected in basic statistics. The figures are given in Table 1.

Table 1 – A Decade of Households’ Living Conditions (Everyday Experience) in Nigeria and Ghana
Source: Afrobarometer (2014) data (Round 2 and 5 surveys).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of population saying they regularly lack:</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean water for home use</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash income</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the reasons for the emergence of democracy and economic growth, on the one hand, and enduring poverty, on the other, could be the existence of societal conflict. Heterogeneous ethnicity characterizes both countries. Democratization and ethno-religious conflict have been associated with Nigeria’s political scene in the past (Achumba and Ighomereho, 2013; Howard, 2010). In Nigeria, the level of religious and ethnic conflict and violence is high. A major threat confronting the habitable co-existence of people in Nigeria is increasing terrorism and violence. These issues can partly be traced to the disconnect between the people and the government, and in several cases, to kidnappings in the Niger Delta region (the oil-producing region) by aggrieved youths over the lack of corporate social responsibility by the oil companies active there (Danjibo, n.d.; Ejibowah, 2000). Recently, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the rise of the Islamic sect called Boko Haram (which means ‘Western education is forbidden’) (Danjibo, n.d.).

Nwagboso (2012) has analysed the security challenge in Nigeria. His work has revealed that security challenges in Nigeria can be traced to a long history of bad governance. The study claims that the inability of several regimes in Nigeria to tackle socio-economic problems such as unemployment, poverty, corruption, overpopulation and inadequate access to education has resulted in unrest, anger, violence and rising crime, including kidnappings, ritual killings, armed robbery, suicide bombings, militancy and vandalism. It is obvious that the activities of these insurgents is having an adverse effect on the (i) income of the government from oil revenue, (ii) the involvement of local and foreign investment in the economy and (iii) the security of lives and properties (Achumba and Ighomereho, 2013; Ejibowah, 2000; Nwagboso, 2012), and through these factors, also on the quality of service delivery. This situation is being aggravated in Nigeria by the fact that religious antagonism and conflicting ethnic identities drive the country’s political and economic life, resulting in increased tension, sectarian violence, militia groups, terrorism and ethno-religious conflict in the country (Achumba and Ighomereho, 2013; Gberie, 2011).

Ghana has been more successful in containing civil strife and conflict. Howard (2010: 963) notes that in Ghana, under both military and civilian
administrations, religious, regional and ethnic conflicts have been well managed. Also, the nature of the democratic system differs between the two countries. Since the transition to democracy in Nigeria in 1999, and in Ghana in 1992, the political routes taken by Nigeria and Ghana have been different. Ghana’s political path in terms of democracy has been on a consistent upward trajectory. The quality of elections in Ghana since the return of democracy has improved over the years. In contrast, Nigeria’s political route has suffered many setbacks. The quality and fairness of elections declined continuously in Nigeria, until the 2011 election, which was evaluated as better than all previous elections (Gberie, 2011).

Indeed, unlike Nigeria, Ghana is seen as a model for successful democratization and government interventions. Ghana gained independence in 1957, making it the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa to gain freedom from her colonial masters. The country is known for its successive economic and political reforms. The differences between both countries are reflected in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012) published by the World Bank. Table 2 compares Ghana and Nigeria on six indicators for good governance and shows that as a government, Ghana scores better than Nigeria these indicators. Table 2 also presents a comparison of Nigeria and Ghana on some key demographic, political, economic and welfare indicators.

Table 2 shows the significant differences between Nigeria and Ghana. A number of the indicators reveal the superior progress made in Ghana compared to Nigeria: growth in GDP per capita is 60 per cent higher in Ghana; GDP growth in Ghana is significantly higher; and the indicators for political effectiveness and stability, control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law and regulatory quality all seem to show that Ghana is doing better than Nigeria.
Table 2 – Comparing Nigeria and Ghana on Demographic, Political, Social, Economic and Welfare Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (annual %)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual %)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>15.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>10.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>27.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory quality</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>25.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (total)</td>
<td>129,224,641</td>
<td>168,833,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (annual %)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved water source (% of population with access)</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SATISFACTION

In this article, I attempted to establish an empirically based link between actual service delivery and satisfaction with public service delivery. This section aims to put this analysis in a broader theoretical framework, namely the Individual level and Jurisdictional level determinants of satisfaction.

James (2009:108) has defined satisfaction as an ‘evaluative attitude or behaviour towards some experience or object’. Satisfaction literature has provided a number of explanations as to why citizens may be satisfied or dissatisfied with service delivery. Some are anchored in the Performance model (Roos and Lidstrom, 2014); some in the Expectation Disconfirmation model (Van Ryin, 2004, 2006; Oliver, 1977, 1980; Yi, 1990); and others in the Individual and Jurisdictional models (DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons, 1990; Sharp, 1986; Bovaird et al., 2015).

In the performance model, citizens are expected to form their judgement on how satisfied they are with the actual quality of service delivered by the government compared to their expectations. This informed judgement provides the government with feedback on where demand is high and what it should prioritize in terms of public service delivery. However, this depends on whether the perceptions of citizens about the quality of service delivery are a valid indicator of the actual quality thereof. In that case, one might expect that actual service provision has improved when satisfaction with those services increases.

However, people may also be dissatisfied with public services for other reasons: because it is not ‘their party’ that is in power, or because they live in a rural area and see the differences in service delivery between rural and urban areas, or other factors not directly related to actual service delivery (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Mishler and Rose (2001: 36) note that the assessment of public service delivery is affected not only by overall government performance but also citizens’ own values and circumstances. Personal background and social status can influence the assessment of government performance or policy outcomes. Citizens’ expectations and satisfaction can vary in relation to individual, cultural and contextual characteristics. Individuals/households are likely to hold diverse views as a
result of their gender, age, values, socio-economic background and experiences.

Nonetheless, other scholars have not acknowledged these problems. James (2011: 1425) explains that although citizens’ view of public service delivery often begins with a general perception of the public sector covering a broad range of issues, it is their own access to public services, the reality of public service delivery, their expectations of future service delivery and their trust in the government to deliver that will determine their level of satisfaction. According to James, satisfaction with service delivery is determined purely by the difference between a given citizens’ expectations and experiences. Wessal et al. (2014: 9) agree with this and emphasize that the main problem is that governments in developing countries struggle to provide a basic level of services, while citizens’ expectations of better and quality service delivery are increasing.

This has resulted in the Expectation Disconfirmation Model (EDM) to test citizens' satisfaction. In this model, satisfaction is conceptualized as ‘the difference between the actual service level experienced and the expected quality of service’ (Deichmann and Lall, 2003; James, 2009; Morgeson, 2013; Morgeson and Petrescu, 2011; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006). James (2009) and Reisig and Chandek (2001) explored the EDM with regard to specific service delivery in the local government, and Van Ryzin (2004, 2006) looked at a wide range of urban/local services. Morgeson (2013), Poister and Thomas (2011) and Van Slyke and Roch (2004) examined the expectations of respondents on specific services among state and federal government services. Morgeson (2013) expresses concern about the absence of studies on the application of EDM to national or federal government service delivery. His expectation was that for federal government services the gap between expectations and empirical performance could be larger due to political and geographical reasons. This was backed up by other studies focusing on demographic variables and political attitudes as the main determinant of citizen satisfaction (DeHoog et al., 1990). Beck et al. (1986) used the individual level approach to provide a complex causal interpretation of citizen satisfaction. Also, some studies on racial satisfaction about the quality of services have shown that black people rate
the quality of services much lower than white people (Brown and Coulter, 1983; Aberbach and Walker, 1970). Other researchers found evidence that age, gender, income and home ownership status all affect the evaluation of services (Brown and Coulter, 1983; Roos and Lidstrom, 2014).

Such studies also focus on political attitudes as a measure of citizen satisfaction. Beck et al., (1986) and Stipak (1980) found a strong relationship between community disaffection and service satisfaction. Brown and Coulter (1983) also found a positive and significant relationship between political efficacy and citizen satisfaction.

The individual level model of citizen satisfaction was formalized by DeHoog et al. (1990) as follows:

\[
\text{Satatisfaction}_i = a_0 + b_1 \text{Gender}_i + b_2 \text{Race}_i + b_3 \text{Income}_i + b_4 \text{Age}_i + b_5 \text{Owner of home}_i + b_6 \text{Local Efficacy}_i + b_7 \text{General Efficacy}_i + b_8 \text{Community Attachment}_i
\]

Literature at the jurisdictional level provides arguments that there are jurisdictional differences in service quality and service levels which may affect citizen satisfaction. In other words, citizens are likely to cluster together in certain neighbourhoods based on their race, income level, and socio-economic status and this will affect their evaluation of the public services available to them. The contextual background of a homogenous socio-economic neighbourhood is related to the expectations and satisfaction of the inhabitants of that neighbourhood for instance (DeHoog et al., 1990: 810). Sharp (1986: 70) stressed that those of a higher socio-economic status may be interested in ‘amenities’, working class people in ‘housekeeping’, and lower classes in ‘social services’. DeHoog et al. (1990) emphasize the inclusion of jurisdiction variables in understanding variations in satisfaction with public services. The jurisdictional level model of satisfaction is as follows:
\[ < ESatisfaction \rangle \_i = a_\_ + b\_1 \ [Race - J] \_i + b\_2 \ [Income - J] \_i + \\
\text{b}(3) \ [Social worlds] \_i + b\_4 \ [Consolidation] \_i + b\_5 \ [No.of services] \_i + \\
b\_6 \ [Service Quality] \_i \]

Although much research has been conducted on the role of expectations in public services and its influence on satisfaction in developed countries (James, 2009; Duffy, 2000; Morgeson, 2013; Roch and Poister, 2006; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006), little systematic empirical research has been done in this area in sub-Saharan Africa (Bold et al., 2011; Blaug, Horner and Lekhi, 2004).

In this article, the individual and jurisdictional level theoretical approach was used to test the determinants of citizens’ satisfaction with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana. The individual level in this case is assumed to be household predictors, which is how the data are clustered.

The above provides two research hypotheses about the situation in Ghana and Nigeria:

H1. Satisfaction with service delivery in developing countries such as Nigeria and Ghana is strongly related to citizens’ experienced and perceived quality of public service delivery, as in developed countries.

H2. In developing countries, the determinants of satisfaction with service delivery differ from those in developed countries because the main factors in developing countries are socio-economic/political indicators (poor people receive worse services), where they live (rural or urban area), their gender, whether they are unemployed, their age, their experience and perception of general living conditions in the country and their general perception of the functioning of the government.
DATA AND METHODS

The data in this article address household satisfaction concerning three aspects of service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana during the period 2002–12. The services examined are healthcare services, the provision of food and access to clean water and sanitation. The article is one of a number of recently conducted empirical studies looking at the relationships between citizens and governments’ ability to provide the basic needs of life for their citizens in Nigeria and Ghana.

The data used in this study are based on Rounds 2–5 from the Afrobarometer survey for Nigeria and Ghana. The four rounds of the survey were conducted in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2012. From the four survey waves for Nigeria and Ghana, 15,512 observations were pooled, resulting in a dataset containing cross-sectional and time-series dimensions.

The Afrobarometer is a research instrument that measures attitudes, behaviours and perception among citizens in relation to political, social and economic issues. The barometer also gathers information on the livelihood of the respondents, how families survive and the formal and informal ways through which citizens gain access to healthcare, food, water, shelter, income and employment. Other related topics in the barometer include governance and social capital. The questions were sorted according to citizens’ perception of the effectiveness, accountability, satisfaction and demand for good governance; questions on social service delivery; overall governance performance; satisfaction with democracy; trust in government; the trustworthiness of various institutions and associations; assessments of economic condition; and opinions about government performance in economic management. Questions in the survey also relate to the accessibility and quality of basic public services provided, as well as the attitudes/perception of respondents in relation to possible alternative service provision and the performance of government on public services provided.

The barometer enables comparisons between countries and regions. The research uses a stratified two-stage random sample (households and localities). Each household had an equal probability of being selected in the
sample (n = 9515 for Nigeria and n = 5997 for Ghana for the period 2002–12).

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variable is satisfaction with public service delivery, defined as social outputs that people in a certain community wish to acquire for their common good. I identified three such public services: healthcare, the provision of food and access to clean water and sanitation. The dependent variables used in the model are thus (i) household satisfaction with basic healthcare services, (ii) household satisfaction with the provision of food, and (iii) household satisfaction with water and sanitation services.

Households were asked how they perceived the government’s handling of improving basic healthcare services, the provision of food, and water and sanitation services. The exact questions can be found in the appendix. Figure 1 presents a pooled comparison of cross-sectional and time-series data of each household’s level of dissatisfaction with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana from 2002 to 2012.

For ease of interpretation of the results, the inverse of the variables in Figure 1 were used as dependent variables in the analysis of the satisfaction model (see Table 3). The variables describe households’ perception of the government’s handling of some basic public services from 2002–12. The total number of data pooled for both countries was 15,512, out of which 9515 were households from Nigeria and 5997 from Ghana. Figure 1 shows that 54 per cent of the households in Nigeria were dissatisfied about their government’s efforts to improve basic healthcare services. Some 82 per cent of the sample population for Nigeria took the view that the government did not properly address the provision of food. Some 71 per cent of the Nigerians admitted that they do not have access to clean water for home use. Compared to Nigeria, Ghanaian households were relatively satisfied. Only 29 per cent of Ghanaians thought that basic
healthcare services were available and 49 per cent said that provision of food was inadequate.

**Figure 1 – Households dissatisfied with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana (2002-12).**
Source: Author’s calculations from Afrobarometer data, rounds 2-5 (2014).

The emergence of the National Healthcare Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana may be one reason why households were relatively satisfied with basic healthcare services in Ghana. It is compulsory for all Ghanaians to join the NHIS, which provides a host of health benefits. Healthcare financing is viewed as a challenge in sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, user fees are the basis for financing healthcare (as is the case in Nigeria). This prevents low-income earners from accessing basic healthcare services. Dalingjong and Laar (2012:11) report enormous success with the NHIS in Ghana and both the insured and uninsured in Ghana are satisfied with basic healthcare services. Table 3 provides a breakdown of household satisfaction with basic public services over a ten-year period. The result obtained in Table 3
corresponds to the pooled cross-sectional data in Figure 1. It is interesting to note that each round of the Afrobarometer data presents a survey of different households. The survey does not trace the same households over the years, yet the percentage of households satisfied with basic public services are within a close range for each of the year survey given in Table 3.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables consist of the household characteristics that determine satisfaction and the problems experienced with service delivery. The control variables include: (i) the age of the respondent; (ii) the location of the respondent (rural); (iii) the gender of the respondent (female); (iv) employment status (unemployed); (v) country variable; (vi) problems experienced with service delivery; and (vii) expectations of government performance (president, national assembly/members of parliament and local government council). For the recoding of these variables, see the appendix.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This study uses the binominal logistic regression model of satisfaction with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana. A logistic model was used to predict the effects of the predictors on the outcomes. I used the logistic model to predict the chances of citizens’ satisfaction with basic public services, as well as perceptions of the government’s performance. The model relates satisfaction to a collection of predictors, including public performance variables. This approach helped me to analyse the odds ratios of households being either satisfied or dissatisfied with the delivery of a range of public services. A binary score of satisfaction was used in the model. In the binominal logistic model, the dependent variables for the first and second hypotheses were satisfaction with service delivery. The predictors include gender, age, household income, residence (rural), employment status, and government performance.
The outcomes of such analyses are given in odds ratios. These represent the increase or decrease in the probability that the dependent variable will be positive. An odds ratio above one (1.0) gives the relative increase in the probability that the value of the independent variable will be positive, and an odds ratio below 1.0 gives the corresponding decrease in the probability that the dependent variable will be positive. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 – Binomial Logistic Regression Model with Odds-ratio, P-value and 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of Household Satisfaction with Service Delivery in Nigeria and Ghana from 2002–12

Note: Indicates *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Satisfaction Basic Healthcare</th>
<th>Model 2 Satisfaction Food Provision</th>
<th>Model 3 Satisfaction Water and Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odds ratio (95% CI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 18–36 (ref)</td>
<td>1.03 [0.95, 1.11]</td>
<td>1.03 [0.95, 1.13]</td>
<td>1.06 [0.98, 1.16]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.04 [0.97, 1.13]</td>
<td>1.04 [0.96, 1.13]</td>
<td>1.06 [0.98, 1.15]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.89 [0.82, 0.96]**</td>
<td>1.07 [0.98, 1.17]</td>
<td>0.85 [0.79, 0.92]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (Nigeria)</td>
<td>0.47 [0.43, 0.51]***</td>
<td>0.26 [0.23, 0.28]***</td>
<td>0.44 [0.40, 0.47]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.06 [0.99, 1.15]</td>
<td>1.01 [0.93, 1.10]</td>
<td>0.92 [0.85, 0.99]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>0.99 [0.91, 1.07]</td>
<td>0.70 [0.64, 0.77]***</td>
<td>0.91 [0.84, 0.99]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced</td>
<td>0.65 [0.59, 0.71]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with medical care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced</td>
<td>0.78 [0.70, 0.86]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with food provision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced</td>
<td>0.59 [0.54, 0.64]***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction Govt</td>
<td>0.41 [0.37, 0.44]***</td>
<td>0.36 [0.32, 0.40]***</td>
<td>0.49 [0.44, 0.53]***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 shows the covariates between the independent and dependent variables. The table provides a micro-level analysis of the odds that households are satisfied with basic public services in Nigeria and Ghana for the period 2002–12. I used a binomial logistic regression model to estimate the odds of satisfaction with basic healthcare, the provision of food and access to clean water and sanitation.

Comparing the levels of satisfaction with public service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana, Table 3 shows that satisfaction with service delivery at the national level increases when the actual problems with service delivery are smaller.

---

1 MP/NA Rep = Members of Parliament/National Assembly Representatives
2 LGC = Local Government Council.
3 This means the logistic models correctly predicted 67%, 76% and 68% of the values for model 1, 2 and 3, respectively; the rest are misclassified.
4 All the year coefficients are all comparisons with year 2012 and are all positive and significant, implying that all things being equal, and households are more likely to be dissatisfied with service delivery in the later year (2012).
According to hypothesis 1, household satisfaction with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana in relation to citizen experiences and the quality of public service delivery is perceived in the same strong way as in developed countries. This study finds, as expected, that satisfaction with the provision of medical care depends strongly on the absence of experienced problems with healthcare (odd ratio is 0.65, indicating that when people have frequently experienced problems with healthcare, their satisfaction is only 65 per cent of the average level of satisfaction). The same significant relationships are found regarding food provision (odds are 0.78) and the provision of water and sanitation (odds are 0.59). This latter result implies that the probability of someone being satisfied with the service delivery in the area of water and sanitation drops by more than 40% if he or she has experienced problems with the delivery thereof.

When I compare Table 2 to I results in Table 3, I notice a disparity in the percentage of households that are satisfied with service delivery in Ghana in comparison to Nigeria. Although Table 2 shows that Ghana is above average regarding the percentage of people satisfied with service delivery, the satisfaction with service delivery in all the three policy areas has deteriorated in the last decade: the odds of being satisfied in 2002 were 20 to 40 per cent higher than in 2012. This implies that service delivery has not improved in either country.

In the introduction, I explained that governments in sub-Saharan countries are working with donor agencies at the forefront of combating poverty through a number of interventions to improve public service delivery (Wessal et al., 2014). However, the outcomes of the model are not indicative of any improvement. On the contrary, the implication of the findings is that the effectiveness of current strategies for addressing service delivery challenges in Nigeria and Ghana needs to be reconsidered.

Hypothesis 2 states that in developing countries differ from developed countries in that satisfaction with service delivery varies according to socio-economic/political indicators, (poor people are expected to get worse services), their place of residence (people in rural areas get worse services), their political opinions (satisfaction with government performance in general).
Examining these claims, the findings show that place of residence is a significant variable in determining citizens’ level of satisfaction with service delivery in the case of healthcare, access to clean water and sanitation. It is, however, not a significant factor for the provision of food. Models 1 and 3 in Table 3 show that the odds of rural households being satisfied with basic healthcare and access to clean water and sanitation are 0.89 and 0.85 times lower, respectively, than in urban households, holding all the other variables constant. Rural households were consistently more dissatisfied with public service delivery compared to households in urban areas. Apart from food, rural households receive worse services than people in urban areas (Moti, 2011: 13). The non-significance of the rural variable is not surprising as rural households are the sole providers of household foodstuffs through peasant farming (Anger, 2010).

The political factor is not to be neglected either. Dissatisfaction with service delivery is strongly related to dissatisfaction with the performance of the president, and to a lesser extent the performance of Parliament and local government. The respondents see the poor performance of local government and members of Parliament as the main cause of poor service delivery. The influence of the president is, according to the households investigated, the largest. The odds of a household being dissatisfied with government performance at all levels of administration – that is, federal level, state level and local level – on the provision of food is 0.36, 0.69 and 0.68 times, respectively, less than the odds of it being satisfied. The effects of government performance on the dependent variable in models 2 and 3 are similar. Citizens’ dissatisfaction with perceived government performance at all levels of the administration is another concern that arises from this study. The result corresponds to the discussion on good governance in Table 3, particularly in Nigeria. Satisfaction with service delivery is therefore also, in part, a political issue.

Finally, contrary to the claim made in hypothesis 2, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with service delivery is unrelated to gender. Hypothesis 2 stated that women in sub-Saharan Africa have many issues to deal with when it comes to healthcare and sanitation. Most women require maternal healthcare services from the primary healthcare unit, especially in rural
areas. They also are required to travel long distances in search of water, and sanitation is mainly seen as the sole responsibility of women (Manzi, 2014). More detailed research is probably needed to understand the reasons behind the non-significance of this important variable.

CONCLUSION

This article has addressed the research question on the interrelatedness of experienced problems in public service delivery and the satisfaction of citizens with service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana at the micro level, and the extent to which the effects of failures in service delivery may vary according to the socio-economic, demographic and political views of the citizens. It has assessed the predictors of satisfaction with service delivery at the micro level in Nigeria and Ghana, covering three basic services: healthcare, the provision of food and the provision of water and sanitation.

Two hypotheses regarding service delivery in Ghana and Nigeria were formulated from the Individual level and Jurisdictional level theoretical approach:

H1 Satisfaction with service delivery in developing countries such as Nigeria and Ghana is strongly related to citizens’ experienced and perceived quality of public service delivery, as in developed countries.

H2 In developing countries, satisfaction with service delivery varies with socio-economic indicators – especially with poverty, since poor people get worse services – as well as with their demographic situation and their political views.

The outcomes of this study corroborate both hypotheses, with the exception of the individual characteristics such as gender, age, and so on. Inadequate service delivery is unrelated to such individual characteristics. Dissatisfaction was, as expected, particularly noticeable among those that experience poor services in the area, those that are generally dissatisfied with the performance of politicians (especially their president), those that are poor and those who live in rural areas. Hence, socio-economic, demographic and political factors are important.
Dissatisfaction is partly due to actual experiences with failed service delivery in the three areas included in the model. But the perceived quality of public service delivery also seems to be a political issue caused by dissatisfaction with the performance of elected politicians at the local and national levels, especially the president. Furthermore, the analysis shows that over the last decade, satisfaction with service delivery has not improved. Problems with water and sanitation, food and basic healthcare seem to have deteriorated in Ghana and Nigeria, which could be a major reason why poverty persists in countries like these.

The findings of this article have a number of practical implications for policymakers. The neglect of service delivery in the pursuit of temporary measures to alleviate poverty (the ‘pet projects’ of political office holders) needs to be re-addressed (Arogundade, Adebisi and Ogunro, 2011). If governments want to combat poverty in a sustainable way, they need to reconsider ways to improve service delivery systems, especially in rural areas. Although the alleviation of poverty through the provision of social safety nets and school meal programmes seems to be the focus of government, such approaches only cover the provision of services to a select few, and the intention is often to gain political support and ensure the re-election of the policymakers concerned (Arogundade et al., 2011: 24). The outcomes of this article confirm the thesis that explains differences in satisfaction with service delivery between the densely populated cities and less developed rural areas.

Because service delivery has deteriorated over the years, as this research points out, it is only wise for governments to consider ways to achieve more effective and efficient service delivery that can help the poor, in particular, as it is the poor who suffer the most when service delivery is inadequate. For instance, when basic healthcare services are available, this can improve the quality of life of the poor, leading to their active participation in the economy and resulting in increased overall productivity, a better standard of living and, eventually, a robust economy.

Given the results of this research, I can conclude that the theory used here works in the same way in both developed and developing countries as well as for public and private service delivery, because the relationship
between experience and satisfaction is strong. According to market research in the private sector, satisfaction with services is mainly a function of the quality of previous service provision. In that discipline, it is viewed as mainly a technical problem due to experiences and setbacks encountered in service delivery in the past. This article has shown that such technical solutions are badly needed because it is worrying that in Ghana as well as Nigeria, service delivery for basic goods such as water and sanitation, food provision and healthcare has deteriorated markedly during the last decade, and that in these countries, there are no indications that the Millennium Development Goals have been met.

This article has revealed other factors, besides the technical issues, that imply that regarding public service delivery in developmental countries, a wider spectrum of determinative factors needs to be taken into account. It has shown that from a public administration perspective, political, geographical, demographic and socio-economic factors are part of the reasons why citizens are dissatisfied with service delivery.

It may be misguided to neglect the influence of political factors on public service delivery in developing countries. Political influence results in disparities in service delivery between the poor and those in rural areas, on the one hand, and the rich and those in urban areas, on the other hand. Sustainable poverty alleviation requires not only the improvement of existing services but also the fair distribution of public goods through the provision of basic public services that are more likely to reach a wide and diverse group of people in society.

REFERENCES


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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APPENDIXES

**BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF HOUSEHOLDS SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE DELIVERY IN NIGERIA AND GHANA FROM 2002–12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Satisfaction Basic Healthcare</th>
<th>Model 2 Satisfaction Food Provision</th>
<th>Model 3 Satisfaction Water &amp; Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 18–36 (ref)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.034 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.063 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.044 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.039 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>−0.118 (0.00)**</td>
<td>0.069 (0.11)</td>
<td>−0.159 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (Nigeria)</td>
<td>−0.756 (0.00)**</td>
<td>−1.363 (0.00)**</td>
<td>−0.831 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.061 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.83)</td>
<td>−0.086 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>−0.009 (0.82)</td>
<td>−0.356 (0.00)**</td>
<td>−0.090 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced with medical care</td>
<td>−0.431 (0.00)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced with food provision</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.254 (0.00)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experienced with access to clean water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.533 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Variables Wording and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Variable Label</th>
<th>Variable Question and Value Labels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with public services = 1 if Fairly well and Very well; 0 otherwise.</td>
<td>Q57g. Handling improving basic health services</td>
<td>Q57g Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: improving basic health services?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q57j. Handling ensuring enough to eat</td>
<td>Variable Label: Handling improving basic health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q57i. Handling providing water and</td>
<td>Values: 1–4, 9, 998, −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value Labels: 1 = Very badly, 2 = Fairly badly, 3 = Fairly well, 4 = Very well, 9 = Don't know/Haven’t heard enough, 998 = Refused to answer, −1 = Missing data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q57j Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: ensuring enough to eat?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Variable Label</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q57i Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: ensuring everyone has enough to eat?</td>
<td>Handling ensuring enough to eat</td>
<td>1–4, 9, 998, −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q57i Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: providing water and sanitation services?</td>
<td>Handling providing water and sanitation services</td>
<td>1–4, 9, 998, −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1. Age</td>
<td>Q1. How old were you at your last birthday? +18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q101. Question: Respondent’s gender</td>
<td>Gender of respondent</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q94 Question: Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?</td>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>0–5, 9, 998, −1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1 if location is 2; 0 otherwise</td>
<td><strong>URBRUR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem experience with service delivery</td>
<td>1 if Status is several/many/always; 0 otherwise</td>
<td>Q8a. How often gone without food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q8b. How often gone without water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q8c. How often gone without medical care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q8e. How often gone without cash income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dissatisfaction with government performance = 1 if strongly disapprove/disapprove; 0 otherwise | Q70a. Performance: President
Q70b. Performance: MP/National Assembly rep.
Q70c. Performance: local government councillor | Q70a Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: the president.
Variable Label: Performance: President
Values: 1–4, 9, 998, −1
Value Labels: 1 = Strongly disapprove, 2 = disapprove, 3 = Approve, 4 = Strongly approve, 9 = Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 998 = Refused to answer, −1 = Missing data
Q70b Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: your member of Parliament?
Variable Label: Performance: MP/National Assembly rep.
Values: 1–4, 9, 998, −1
Value Labels: 1 = Strongly disapprove, 2 = disapprove, 3 = Approve, 4 = Strongly approve, 9 = Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 998 = Refused to answer, −1 = Missing data
Q70c Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: your elected Assembly man/woman?
Variable Label: Performance: Local government councillor
Values: 1–4, 9, 998, −1
Value Labels: 1 = Strongly disapprove, 2 = disapprove, 3 = Approve, 4 = Strongly approve, 9 = Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 998 = Refused to answer, −1 = Missing data |
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the 1980s and early 1990s. The book also discusses the most recent phase since the late 1990s, which has been marked by further marketization and privatization of service delivery on the one hand, and some return to public sector provision (“remunicipalization”) on the other. By comprising some 20 European countries, including Central East European “transformation” countries as well as the “sovereign debt”-stricken countries of Southern Europe, the chapters of this volume cover a much broader cross section of countries than other recent publications on the same subject.


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